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Introduction
This monograph surveys the history of what I have called the
'urban mass movement', between August 1983 and October 1987.
The movement - variously referred to as 'cause-oriented
movement', 'people's power', and 'people's movement' - emerged
as a protest movement during the Marcos years, when it
campaigned for the removal of Marcos and for a new government
which would institute democratic rule and carry out a range of
social and economic reforms. 1 More specifically, these terms have
been used to refer to the legal protest movement, as distinct from
the underground, armed, revolutionary movement. During this
period the legal mass movement flourished in both urban and rural
areas but the centre of its activities was in the major urban
settlements, especially Manila.
The period covered by this study is bounded by two
watershed events in modern Philippines history: the assassination
of ex-Senator Benigno Aquino, and the attempted coup d'etat by
Colonel Gregorio Honasan. The assassination of Benigno Aquino
in August 1983 caused a massive outburst of protest which fuelled
an acceleration in the growth of the mass movement and culminated
in the victory over Marcos in February 1986. The next eighteen
months were dominated by the attempts of the new government of
Corazon Aquino to stabilize a form of traditional, parliamentary
government. The attempted coup d'etat of August 1987 reflected
the frustration of conservative social forces in the Philippines with
the inability of the Aquino government to bring a permanent end to
the mass movement and the armed, revolutionary underground.
Before embarking on a historical survey, the importance of
the mass movement in the recent political history of the Philippines
should be emphasized. Strictly speaking, President Corazon
Aquino did not come to power through elections, even though she
received more votes than Marcos in the January 1986 presidential
Probably the most succinct statement of the reforms that were being
demanded by the protest movement can be found in the 'Compact' between
several of the most important sectors of the protest movement, dated 6
January 1984.
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elections. That her government was not a 'duly-elected
constitutional government' was acknowledged in practice when she
declared a Provisional Government and adopted the 'Freedom
Constitution', a hastily-produced document, which gave her virtual
dictatorial powers until a new constitution, drawn up by people
chosen by the president herself, was ratified (Mamot 1987; Sison
1986). Essentially, Mrs Aquino's mandate was derived from the
popular mass movement. The actions of the mass movement were
far more important than the counting of votes; its defiance of the
Marcos government rendered the Philippines increasingly
ungovernable and made the removal of Marcos inevitable.
During the election campaign itself, mobilization of the people
was critically important. The National Citizens Movement for Free
Elections (Namfrel), led by big businessman and later Aquino's
trade minister, Jose Concepcion, mobilized thousands of people
who guarded ballot boxes and checked counting procedures.
Drawing mostly on middle-class elements, it was active in almost
all major cities and was particularly strong in Manila. Namfrel was
not the only such organization. Another organization, TAPAT,
mobilized workers and students in a similar election-monitoring
exercise. TAPAT, a much smaller group, was led by groups
identified with the Filipino Left.
After the election Aquino defied Marcos by refusing to accept
the official declaration of the Batasang Pambansa (National
Assembly) that Marcos had been elected president, and by
unilaterally being sworn in as president. The response of the mass
movement to Marcos's cheating was a declaration of support for a
campaign of civil disobedience which was announced by Aquino
on 16 February 1986 to a crowd of at least one million people at a
rally in Luneta Park, Manila. The campaign was to start with
boycotts of stores owned by Marcos cronies and the withdrawal of
funds from crony-owned banks. While Aquino committed that
section of the mass movement most loyally supportive of her to this
relatively moderate path, the large and militant organization,
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (New Patriotic Alliance) or
BAYAN (The People), indicated it would support such a campaign
with strikes and other mass actions. Indeed, BAYAN had called
for a general strike before Aquino's announcement. The threat of a
general strike was particulary significant given the success, during
the previous year, of the welgang bayan (people's strike) actions
that BAYAN forces had launched in some cities. These involved
Introduction
strikes combined with protest actions, pickets and any other
measures that the BAYANforces were able to manage.
There was also, of course, a military revolt led by Defence
Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, Acting Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff
General Fidel Ramos, and Enrile's security advisor, Colonel
Gregorio Honasan. Even this mutiny, however, was a by-product
of the previous three years of mobilizational politics. The influence
of the Enrile-Honasan faction within the military was exercised
through the activities of the Reform the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Movement (RAM). RAM's mode of operation and
style of activities followed those of the mass movement, using
manifestos, open letters, newsletters and slogan-festooned T-shirts.
Ultimately, however, RAM had a very different agenda from the
mass movement (McCoy and Robinson 1986). Its growing
influence lay in the fact that it rode the waves of mobilized
dissatisfaction that emerged after Senator Aquino's assassination in
August 1983.
Chapter 1
From Assassination to Revolution: August 1983-
February 1986
The potency of the anti-cheating activism of the January 1986
election campaign, as well as the civil disobedience campaign of late
January, drew on the momentum that the mass movement had
developed since the August 1983 assassination of Benigno Aquino.
An estimated two million protesters had attended his funeral in
Manila, creating an atmosphere which involved even the previously
politically inactive middle class. The Makati business district
subsequently became famous for its anti-Marcos, yellow, ticker-
tape parades.
Besides the several very effective welgang bayan launched by
the Left, the urban mass movement was able to organize
demonstrations on the anniversaries of Aquino's assassination and
Marcos's declaration of martial law and on many other occasions
between 1983 and 1986. Another new way of mobilizing people
was the lakbayan or people's marches. In the largest of these, the
Tarlac-to-Tarmac lakbayan, people marched from Tarlac Province
(where the Aquinos come from) to Manila International Airport
(where Benigno Aquino was assassinated). This attracted not only
tens of thousands of participants, but also massive support from the
residents in the areas through which it passed, who supplied food
and shelter as well as moral support (see Fe Zamora in Mr and Ms
3, 10, February 1984). There were even 'people's jogs'. Agapito
'Butz' Aquino, Benigno Aquino's brother, led about four thousand
August Twenty-One Movement (ATOM) members in a protest jog
from a small town north of Manila, down into Manila. Cleverly
taking advantage of the current middle class fad for jogging, the
protest was known as 'Run On Against Marcos and for
Reconciliation' (ROAR). It too gained the support of the local
people. When the military moved to block off the road and the
mainly middle-class joggers had to camp outside a church for
several nights, food and drink were brought in and priests, folk
singers and more people flocked to the area. When the joggers
reached Manila, they were greeted by a crowd estimated at one
million people {Malaya 1-2 February, 1984). Demonstrations,
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welgang bayan, lakbayan, teach-ins, rallies, marches, strikes,
leaflets and placards became the elements of mass political culture -
along with violent dispersals, tear-gas, arrests, torture,
'salvagings'1 and disappearances.
This 'parliament-of-the-streets'2 provided the real opposition
to Marcos and helped prepare the people in Manila and other cities
for the February 1986 Revolution. Although the movement
generated considerable spontaneous and unorganized support, it
was not entirely spontaneous and unorganized. It brought together
various existing organizations as well as giving birth to new ones.
The most conservative organizations were the opposition
political parties, in particular Salvador Laurel's United Nationalist
Democratic Organization (UNIDO), Jovito Salonga's Liberal Party
and Peping Cojuangco's Philippine Democratic Paxty-Lakas ng
Bayan (PDP-Laban, People's Power). These parties had, and still
have, their basis in alliances between landlords and military in the
countryside, and business and military in the urban centres. Their
relationship with their mass following, especially in the
countryside, is based on patron-client relationships; rural supporters
often vote for them out of fear, out of feudal 'gratitude' or because
of vote-buying or parochial pork-barreling. Such parties do not
have a continuing mass base, but exist only at election time (Lande
1968; Rivera 1985).
Much more important for mass movement politics were the
militant, and already large, left-wing, sectoral organizations. In
Filipino political usage, the 'sectors' comprise the workers,
peasants, students, teachers, artists, urban poor, and women. Each
ideological current in the Philippines has its own sectoral
organizations, but the most active are those on the Left. These
1 The term 'salvaging' is used in the Philippines to refer to the political
killing of grassroots activists.
2 The term 'parliament-of-the-streets' first emerged during the period of
nationalist protests and mobilizations in the 1960s and early 1970s. These
big demonstrations, which in fact preceded martial law, were the first to
establish the tradition of urban mass mobilization in the cities. The most
important organization during that period was Josa Maria Sison's
Kabataang Makabayan (National Youth), the forerunner of today's Natdem
groups.
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include the Kilusang Mayo Uno (First of May Movement, KMU) a
union movement, the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas
(Philippines Peasants' Movement, KMP), the League of Filipino
Students (LFS), the Association of Concerned Teachers, National
Democratic Youth Movement (KADENA), the Association of
Concerned Artists and, later, GABRIELA, an umbrella organization
of women's organizations. Sectoral organizations had already
experienced serious repression by the Marcos government, with
many of their members having been arrested or assassinated, and
they were the backbone of the welgang bayan actions.
The left-wing organizations are classified by Filipinos as
'National Democratic' ('Natdem'), that is, inspired by a political
program broadly similar in perspective to that of the National
Democratic Front (NDF). However, there was also a number of
smaller sectoral organizations identified as 'Social Democratic'.
('Socdem'). These were considered to be inspired by the political
program of the Philippines Democratic Socialist Party (PDSP),
which, like the NDF, existed underground. Like the NDF, the
Socdems maintained an armed force, though it was much smaller
and virtually inactive. Amongst the larger, above-ground Socdem
groups were urban poor community organizations, the Federation
of Free Workers (FFW) and a number of smaller peasant
organizations. They collaborated with parts of the Church, in
particular the Jesuits. The Socdems experienced significant growth
during the post-assassination period, when many of the newly
activated middle-class forces were drawn to their organizations.
One new organization which became very active in mass
mobilization, and drew in significant middle-class forces, at least up
until 1985, was the August Twenty-One Movement (ATOM) (21
August being the day upon which ex-Senator Aquino was
assassinated). ATOM was led by Benigno Aquino's brother, film
actor, Agapito 'Butz'Aquino. Butz Aquino soon emerged as the
Socdems' most popular figure. ATOM drew other non-affiliated
groups around it, giving the Socdems a more effective mass-
mobilization wing than they had ever had before. In June 1985 the
Socdem groups which engaged in mass-mobilization activity -
ATOM, the unions, urban poor groups, and Socdem-influenced
church groups - were brought together under the umbrella
organization Bansang Nagakaisa sa Diwa atLayunin (BANDILA).
Once again Butz Aquino figured prominently.
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Apart from the old established parties, the National Democrats
and the Social Democrats, there was a loose grouping referred to as
the 'Liberal Democrats'. Before 1985, the main organizational base
for these people was human rights and legal aid organizations. The
two most important were Mabini and the Free Legal Assistance
Group (FLAG). As might be expected, given their organizational
commitments, the Liberal Democrats were particulary concerned
with Marcos 's infringements of human rights. While often having
only small organizational bases, the Liberal Democrats had
substantial personal followings because of their articulateness and
high public profile.
The underground organizations, the National Democratic
Front (NDF) and the Philippine Democratic Socialist Party (PDSP),
also mobilized their memberships. The NDF is easily the bigger
and more militant of the two. Besides the 30,000-strong
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its guerilla wing the
New Peoples' Army (NPA), it includes worker, peasant, youth,
teacher and women's organizations. The youth organization,
Kabataang Makabayan (Patriotic Youth) is reportedly the strongest
of these.3 The official pronouncements of the NDF and the CPP
always supported the mass mobilizations and they carried great
weight among above-ground activists as well as among the more
radical organizations. The NDF's support was essential for success
during the period up to December 1986.
There were, not unexpectedly, ideological differences among
these groups. There were also differences on questions of methods
of operation. However, during the post-assassination period there
was a more-or-less effective working coalition. While the
organizational strength of the National Democrats provided the
backbone for mass mobilizations, it was the breadth of the coalition
which provided the kind of authority needed to be able to mobilize
huge numbers of those citizens still only partially radicalized. It
was not unusual for mass mobilizations to involve hundreds of
thousands of people. For example, on the anniversary of Benigno
Information on the underground movement is based on the NDF
publication Liberation, the Communist Party of the Philippines
newspaper, Ang Bayan, and discussions with participants.
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Aquino's death in 1984 there was a mass mobilization of over one
million people, despite the ever-present threat of violent dispersal.
The framework within which Natdem, Socdem, and Libdem
all tried to work together was also formally organized. The first
coalition was called Justice for Aquino Justice for All (JAJA). It
was born out of the protests around Senator Aquino's assassination
and it was through JAJA, directly or indirectly, that most of the
very large mobilizations between August 1983 and May 1984 were
organized. The different components, however, continued to
conduct their separate activities.
The formation of JAJA was a major breakthrough for the anti-
dictatorship movement in that it formalized, for the first time, a
coalition among centre, left-of-centre and leftist forces. It was a
breakthrough for the Left in particular, which was now able to
speak to the supporters of the other forces, at mass demonstrations
and other rallies as well as to the mass of non-organized people
who became involved.
There was some breakdown in the coalition when, in 1984,
JAJA gave way to a new formation called the Coalition for the
Restoration of Democracy (CORD). While JAJA had evolved to
organize the protest at Senator Aquino's funeral, CORD evolved
out of the need for the anti-Marcos forces to come to a unified
position on the 1984 elections for the national assembly.
In January 1984 a very successful national assembly of
oppositionists, called the Filipino People's Congress (KOMPIL),
was held. This Congress was attended by five thousand delegates
from all the above-ground, anti-Marcos forces. It was a major
event and an important boost to the morale of the opposition. The
main outcome of the congress was the issuance of a 'Call for
Meaningful Elections' (see Horatio V. Pardedes in Mr and Ms 27
January 1984). This statement indicated that the opposition forces
would not participate in the 1984 elections unless Marcos
relinquished his powers to issue legislation by decree and to veto
legislation passed by the Batasang Pambansa. Both of these
powers completely negated the role of the Batasan. When Marcos
refused to accept these conditions the majority of the opposition
declared a boycott.4 The minority, led by Salvador Laurel's
Nemenzo (1984). Also see WON: Facts and Figures 29 February 1984;
'Resolution to boycott the 1984 Plebiscite and Batasan Elections', 10
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UNIDO, decided to participate and campaign against Marcos 's
Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (New Society Movement, KBL). While
CORD's boycott mobilizations did not match the size or momentum
of the post-assassination protests, they kept the level of political
activity very high. Also maintained were the links being formed
among those groups most oriented towards non-violent activism
and mobilization politics, which began to be referred to as 'pressure
polities'. The groups included the Natdems (National Democrats),
the Socdems (Social Democrats) and the most militant sections of
the Libdems (Liberal Democrats) including such figures as former
Senator Jose Diokno.
The coalition politics that developed between August 1983
and the middle of 1985 was a new phenomenon for the
Philippines.5 The political currents most oriented towards mass
action, the Natdems and Socdems, had been forced underground
after the declaration of martial law in 1972. The Natdems had to
struggle hard to obtain any kind of place under the 'legal' sun. The
first step was to build strong sectoral organizations, such as unions
and student organizations.
In 1983 there was no above-ground organization built around
a general political program which could attract the sectoral groups.
This situation was evident in rallies during 1984. Speakers at such
rallies could be divided into two groups: those who spoke for an
ideologically-oriented umbrella organization or for a major
ideological group (mainly Libdem and Socdem); and those who
spoke for a specific, sectoral, mass organization and aired that
sector's grievances. The latter were always the most radical and
January 1984 (roneoed); 'Strive for National Unity, Struggle for
Democracy, (Statement of the League of Filipino Students on the Batasang
Pambansa elections)', published in pamphlet form, as a special issue of
Commitment: and 'An Enlightened and Militant Boycott of the 1984
Plebiscite and Batasan Election', Philippines Sign 21-27 January 1984.
An important coalition grouping, the Movement for the Advancement of
Nationalism, was formed in the 1960s. It brought leftists and nationalists
together, but withered as an effective coalition during the period of turmoir
inside the old communist party. In 1981 another coalition was formed to
boycott the presidential elections of that year. It was called People's
Opposition to Plebiscite and Election and the Movement for Independence,
Nationalism and Democracy or People's Mind.
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generally came from the Natdem groups. It was also their
organizations which provided the core attendance at any mass
mobilization. The August Twenty-One Movement (ATOM) also
provided an organized, though much smaller, group. The rest of
those at mobilizations were people who did not belong to any
specific political group. They were, nevertheless, sympathetic to the
demands of the mass movement and had their morale boosted by
the level of organized support for a rally.
At the ideological level, the radical perspective came to be
articulated by the militant wing of the Liberal Democrats, a key
figure in which was Jose Diokno. This was the closest the
Natdems came to having a spokesperson not identified with a single
sectoral group during this period, despite the fact that the Natdem
groups had organized themselves into a 'multi-sectoral',
ideologically-oriented organization as early November 1983
(NAJFD 1983; interview with Fr Jose Dizon, then deputy
secretary-general, NAJFD July 1984). This was the Nationalist
Alliance for Justice, Freedom and Democracy (NAJFD), often
referred to as the Nationalist Alliance. Reflecting its strong, multi-
sectoral composition, the Nationalist Alliance was soon bringing
out policies which promoted the interests of labour, the peasantry,
students, and women.6 It also worked closely with human rights
groups. As a Natdem grouping it heavily emphasized nationalist
issues, in particular, opposition to US influence in the country and
the presence of US military bases. It was able to win over leading
opposition figures such as the nationalist elder statesman of
opposition politics, Senator Lorenzo Taiiada. Leading figures from
the sectoral organizations, especially the teachers and students
organizations, also took on prominent positions.
The Nationalist Alliance was also able to participate as a
member of CORD, representing Natdem positions in discussions
and statements. But while these carried authority amongst NAJFD
followers, there was still no other NAJFD leader with the popular
authority of Senator Diokno. At rallies and demonstrations the
popular Natdem figures were those from sectoral organizations,
such as Rolando Olalia from the KMU, Elmer Mercado from the
For a compendium of these policies, see NAJFD (1984) and the NAJFD
newsletter, Nationalist Alternative.
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League of Filipino Students and Etta Rosales from the Association
of Concerned Teachers.
Also in 1984, Senator Diokno, together with other nationalist
Libdems and unaffiliated radicals, established a new grouping
called Kilusan sa Kapangyarihan at Karapatan ng Bayan
(Movement for People's Sovereignty and Democracy), usually
referred to as KAAKBAY. Very similar in outlook to the Natdems,
it could be distinguished from them ideologically primarily by its
emphasis first on being 'ideologically independent' (not Natdem or
Socdem) and, secondly, on the role of non-violent activism or
'pressure polities'. While all groups agreed that pressure politics
was an important tactic to be used against Marcos, KAAKBAY
tended to elevate it to a principle and saw it as a new, essential
component of any post-Marcos democracy. Some people started
talking about a political system which institutionalized a powerful
role for the 'parliament-of-the-streets' as one of 'popular
democracy'. The first major elucidation of this idea was set out in
the August 1984 edition of a publication called Plaridel Papers.7
KAAKBAY, however, had no significant sectoral organizations
affiliated to it and no major mass base. It was always a small
organization, its strength stemming from the personal popularity of
Diokno and the fact that it had recruited some very able and popular
political commentators (interview with KAAKBAY activists, July
1984).
The emphasis on non-violent pressure politics was also
important.8 No significant element amongst the three currents
attacked the New Peoples Army during this period. However there
was an ongoing debate as to what emphasis should be given to
7 'Elite Democracy versus Popular Democracy', in Plaridel Papers (Manila,
August 1984). The publication was widely read in Manila. The
documents carried no names, however the publication was described as
follows: 'PLARIDEL PAPERS, named after Marcelo H. del Pilar who
struggled peacefully for reforms but remained open to the revolutionary
option, are prepared by a group of politically active, middle class
professionals to provide meaningful direction and thought to current actions
for freedom and justice'.
8 The most important argument for non-violent change was by Professor
Randy David, leader of KAAKBY (David 1984).
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armed struggle in the countryside and mass political struggle in the
cities. People like Diokno were already convinced that even in the
short term mass political struggle could make the Philippines so
ungovernable that the US would be forced to withdraw its support
for Marcos, thus ensuring that he could be toppled (interview with
Senator Diokno, July 1984).
The underground National Democratic Front argued for
primary emphasis to be given to armed struggle in the countryside.
Many in the underground still felt that even the toppling of Marcos,
as distinct from the social revolution itself, could only be achieved
through an armed victory. They were certain that the US would not
withdraw its support for Marcos no matter how advanced the
'parliament-of-the-streets' movement became.
By late 1984, therefore, the ideological spectrum within the
'pressure politics' wing of the anti-Marcos movement had been
organizationally clarified. Founded in 1984 and active during the
next twelve months, the following organizations had started to
consolidate themselves: ATOM for the Social Democrats,?
Nationalist Alliance for the National Democrats, and KAAKBAY
for the militant and nationalist wing of the Liberal Democrats.
KAAKBAY, which itself was a coalition, also included a number
of independent Marxists. There were also groups, such as Mabini
and FLAG, which did not consistently align themselves with any of
the three political currents but were united primarily around
opposition to Marcos. Some of these latter people emerged to play
a very important role in the Aquino government during its first
twelve months. Additionally, outside the mass movement but often
co-operating with it were the established opposition political parties.
With the clarification of ideologies of the organizations within
the mass movement, the next initiative was aimed at establishing a
formal and permanent coalition between these groups and the more
liberal of the traditional parties.
In fact a more modest unification initiative had occurred as
early as January 1984, when an agreement was reached among
ATOM was not an umbrella organization like NAJFD or KAAKBAY;
however, the high profile of its leader, Butz Aquino, and the fact that it was
the most active Socdem group in the 'parliament-of-the-streets', elevated its
position to that of de facto Socdem representative group. This role was
later taken over by BANDILA.
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KAAKBAY, the Nationalist Alliance, the Liberal Party, and PDP-
Laban. This agreement, known as the 'Compact', called for the
establishment of a Preparatory Commission to prepare for a
transitional government in the case of the removal of Marcos. The
'Compact' also set out the major reform proposals of the mass
movement. These included land reform, removal of the US military
bases, rescheduling the foreign debt, 'neutralization' of the country,
repeal of all repressive laws and decrees and the re-institution of a
free press.
In May 1985 there was another, more ambitious, initiative.
The founding congress of BAYAN was held. This congress
attempted to establish a 'unified command' for the major currents:
Natdem, Socdem, nationalist Libdem and the 'unaligned' Libdems.
Big business organizations which had become involved in anti-
Marcos activities were also included. Considerable effort was put
into preparing for the congress. It proved successful and most of
the organizers were optimistic. The breadth of participation was
reflected in the composition of the interim officers chosen by the
congress's organizing committee:
chairperson: Lorenzo Tanada [nationalist Libdem]
president: Jose Diokno [KAAKBAY s Libdem]
vice-president: Ambrosia Padilla [Nationalist Alliance -
Libdem]
executive
vice-presidents: Etta Rosales [Association of Concerned
Teachers - Natdem]
Teofisto Guingona [SANDATA lawyers
group - Socdem]
Rolando Olalia [chairman of KMU -
Natdem]
secretary-general: Butz Aquino [ATOM - Socdem]-
Diokno was elected in absentia.
The congress opened with agreement on four general
principles: popular democracy, as opposed to both dictatorship and
the 'elite democracy' that existed in the Philippines prior to martial
law; national sovereignty, as opposed to imperialism and all forms
of foreign domination; people's welfare and economic
development, as opposed to social structures that perpetuate
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economic inequality, and national unity, which was defined as
'solidarity between all genuinely patriotic and democratic classes,
sectors and forces of Philippines society', not just a unity of
politicians (Mr andMs 3-9 May 1985).
The concept of popular democracy had begun to gain
credence during the discussion that followed the Plaridel Papers. It
also reflected the key role of KAAKBAY intellectuals in
formulating policy for the movement at this time. The draft papers
for the BAYAN congress were drawn up by a group under the
chairmanship of Ed Garcia. Garcia, like the other important
KAAKBAY intellectual, Randy David, was an academic at the
University of the Philippines. The importance of the concept of
popular democracy was that it represented a demand that the
'parliament-of-the-streets' play a permanent role in Filipino politics.
As the weekly magazine Mr & Ms reported:
The traditional political parties, Diokno says, 'kind of go
to sleep between elections'. What would make BAYAN
different is that while it 'hopes to take part in the normal
electoral activities,' it also intends 'to keep up pressure
on government by extra-legal but not illegal means',
including the usual demonstrations and rallies, as well as
human chains, general strikes and other untested forms
of mass action (ibid.).
With such ambitious aims as institutionalizing 'popular
democracy' and establishing a unified command for the movement,
the question of representation for the various groups on decision
making bodies became central. Controversy over this issue
overshadowed much of the progress that was made on policy
issues. Towards the end of the congress the disagreements became
sharper and the alliance started to break up.10
10 The core of the controversy was over the representation to be given to
organizations from the provinces. The Socdem groups insisted that each
province have only one representative. The provincial organizations,
which were mostly Natdem or similarly oriented, insisted on proportional
representation. At the same time, the Socdems had achieved acceptance
that the big businesspeople's group, Manindigan, be given four or five
seats. For the respective views of BANDILA, BAYAN and KAAKBAY on
these differences, see Manansala (1986).
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The initial breakaway was made by the main Socdem groups,
including ATOM, the lawyers' group SANDATA, and the SAPAK
group headed by influential Socdem figure, Marito Canonigo.
They walked out of the congress, refusing to participate in the
National Council elections. Later, in June, the Socdem groups
went on to establish their own umbrella organization, Bagong
Afyansang Nagkakaisa sa Diwa atLayunin (BANDJLA). Its main
figures were Butz Aquino and Teofisto Guingonan (Mr and Ms, 7-
13 June 1985).
With the second largest block, the Socdems, withdrawn, the
Natdems were left with an overwhelming organizational majority.
In the eyes of others still in BAYAN, the broad nature of the
coalition was therefore lost. Later in the same month, the president
of BAYAN, ex-Senator Diokno, also resigned.1! This signalled the
departure from BAYAN of the major remaining non-Natdem
forces. As a result, BAYAN today is essentially an umbrella
organization for the major Natdem-oriented organizations, such as
the KMU, KMP, LFS and KADENA. With these organizations as
the backbone of its militant politics, it has been able to attract a large
number of other organizations, especially in the provinces. In
1986, BAYAN claimed to have over 1000 affiliates. The
Nationalist Alliance continued to exist but was increasingly
overshadowed by BAYAN; by 1986 it had transformed itself into
an educational and research organization catering to the needs of
BAYAN affiliates and other radical groups.
The failure of the BAYAN congress to establish a broad front
was a setback. There no longer existed the equivalent of JAJA and
CORD. This situation was worsened by a bitter disagreement
between the BAYAN forces and the rest of the movement over what
policy to adopt towards Cory Aquino's presidential campaign.
Marcos had called presidential elections early and the 'snap
elections', as they were called, also created a major 'snap
controversy'. Even after a considerable amount of lobbying
amongst the major leaders of the traditional political parties and the
11 Note Etta Rosales's comment (Mr and Ms 21-27 June 1985) that the
possible replacement for Diokno, KMU Chairman Rolando Olalia, was
'too sectoral'. The Natdem forces were still having problems in projecting
a non-sectoral, political leader.
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mass movement organizations, no leader could be found who
would unite the opposition to Marcos. Finally, the hitherto not-
very-prominent Cory Aquino was agreed upon. Aquino was forced
to agree to run under the UNIDO banner in return for Salvador
Laurel's withdrawal from the presidential contest and acceptance of
the vice-presidential candidature. BANDILA and the non-aligned
Libdems, as well as the traditional parties, all decided unequivocally
to support Aquino's campaign. A new grouping of radical groups,
called Independent Caucus, and KAAKBAY, decided to give
Aquino's campaign 'critical support'. BAYAN called for an active
boycott of the campaign (see documents in Schirmer and Shalom
1987).
The resulting tension within the movement was reflected
inside BAYAN itself. At its second national congress, in July
1986, Secretary-General Lean Alejandro outlined the course of the
internal debate:
The internal division of the federation on whether to
participate or boycott broke out on 28 November, 1986
during the First Emergency Session of the National
Council.... After a much heated day-long debate, with
Senators Tanada and Padilla leading the participation
advocates, it was agreed that BAYAN would participate
if the following conditions were met: the resignation of
Marcos, the synchronisation of the local and presidential
polls, the abolition of the PDA [Preventive Detention Act]
and the full restoration of the writ [of habeas corpus].
The decision was made after a division of the house as
there was no consensus (Alejandro 1986:12).
Alejandro also explained that it was at this meeting that ex-
Senator Tanada announced that he would take leave of absence
from his duties in BAYAN as soon as Aquino announced her
candidacy. Tanada obviously thought that the demands being put to
Marcos would not be met. The debate continued after the meeting
and an emergency session of the national executive committee was
later convened.
The majority still supported a boycott. They considered that
the election would be a sham and that participation in it would foster
illusions that change could be achieved under Marcos through
elections. There were others who argued that the elections would
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provide an important opportunity to conduct political education.
Finally, it was agreed to check on the possibility of coming to an
agreement with the pro-Aquino forces, in particular Aquino's and
Laurel's own groups, over a campaign platform. A committee was
formed to work out the proposals to be submitted to Aquino.
Following this meeting, BAYAN lost another major figure, when
its president, Senator Padilla, tendered his resignation.
A 'Program for a Pro-People Government' was submitted to
Aquino in December. On 8 January 1986 the second emergency
session of the National Council was convened. Not surprisingly,
there had been no agreement between BAYAN and the Aquino-
Laurel camp on at least five major issues: closure of the US military
bases at Subic Bay and Clarke Field; repudiation of foreign debts;
land reform; nationalization of strategic industries; and abrogation
of unequal treaties with the US and Japan. But the debate
continued. As Alejandro reported:
The question of whether to boycott or participate was
opened again due to a motion to reconsider the standing
decision not to participate. After another emotion-laden
debate, the house was divided once again and the motion
was defeated: 82 votes against, 7 for and 3 abstentions.
The form and conduct of the boycott was discussed and
it was agreed upon that BAYAN shall launch an 'active
and militant boycott'. ... BAYAN finally had a firm
decision after 2 NC and 2 NEC meetings and a host of
leave-of-absences and resignations (ibid.:l3).
With this level of acknowledged dissension within BAYAN, it is
not difficult to imagine the problems that arose with, as Alejandro
put it in his report, 'sharp criticisms from our allies'.
The tradition of mass mobilization that BAYAN had helped
establish became the foundation for Aquino's election campaign,
the ballot-box protection activism and finally the February uprising.
The levels of mobilization reached a peak, though they were more
spontaneous and disorganized. Alejandro described the mood of
the mobilizations as 'revolutionary', at the same time
acknowledging: our rallies, statements and fora did not make an
impact ... our mobilizations fell dramatically off the mark relative
to our 'tested' capacity.
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The failure of the boycott campaign also meant that the
BAYAN forces were unable to provide any major leadership
initiatives during the February Revolution itself. As Jose Maria
Sison, founder of the CPP, pointed out in a 1986 analysis of the
post-February political situation, BAYAN forces did take part in the
February uprising. They took part in the mobilizations in Angeles
City which prevented tank reinforcements going to Manila to help
Marcos, and they were involved in actions at Channel 4 TV station
which prevented Marcos forces from taking it back from the anti-
Marcos rebels then in control. It was also BAYAN that mustered a
large protest crowd outside Malacanang Palace on Marcos's last day
(Sison 1987). 12 According to Alejandro, BAYAN members were
also preparing their Manila branches for action should the turmoil
continue - for example, they were preparing to arrest Marcos-
appointed mayors and corrupt officials (Brevern 1986). Indeed,
without both the activism of the BAYAN forces before 1986, and
their interventions in 1986, the February Revolution may not have
been successful. At the same time, however, BAYAN's
'detachment' from the masses, as Alejandro put it, meant that the
BAYAN forces, despite their greater size and militancy, were not
able to play a role in the political leadership of the February
Revolution or, more importantly, its immediate aftermath.
The same situation applied to the National Democratic
underground which had also called for a boycott. The December
1985 issue of the CPP's Ang Bayan published a statement entitled
'Snap Election: Big Political Swindle'. While defending the boycott
campaign, it acknowledged the high level of concern about the
boycott policy within the movement:
... although convinced that a boycott is correct and
conforms to principles and morality, many anti-fascists
and progressives amongst the middle forces are worried
that by boycotting they may be isolating themselves from
the people. Because of this, a substantial number of
them have opted for participation while the rest stand for
12 Anti-leftist commentators at the time blamed the looting of Malacaflang
Palace on BAYAN supporters. However, newspaper reports indicate that
BAYAN forces, along with some priests, tried to prevent the mob entering
the Palace {Manila Times 27 February 1986).
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boycott.... Temporarily, there have also been doubts in
the ranks of the progressive mass organizations and
alliances. While there is unity that this scheme of the
regime [i.e. the elections] should be exposed and
opposed, there was no initial agreement on how to carry
this out. Spirited democratic discussions were given free
reign within the ranks, including those of Party organs
and units (Ang Bayan, December 1985).
The split in the mass movement over the issue of supporting
Aquino was qualitively different from that which occurred over the
question of boycotting the 1984 elections. When in 1984 UNIDO
and the other traditional parties decided to campaign, there was no
real loss to the movement. The traditional parties did not, in fact,
seek to mobilize the people. The 'parliament-of-the-streets'
remained united. In 1986, however, the split was between the best
organized group - which had until then been the backbone of the
mobilizations, namely the Natdems - and the more loosely-
organized and spontaneous wing of the movement. One
consequence of this was that the February Revolution was
spontaneous and disorganized in character and was therefore unable
to give birth to any sustained or institutionalized version of People's
Power. 13 The main organizational input came from the Roman
Catholic Church, which quickly decided to withdraw from
mobilizational politics after Aquino was installed. BANDILA also
provided some organization, including the erection of barricades
and the mobilization of forces. However, the great majority of
people, even those from BAYAN, BANDILA, KAAKBAY and
traditional party supporters, made their own way to mobilizations
outside the two major military camps on the highway EDSA. The
level of organization that groups such as BANDILA were able to
bring to these huge mobilizations was very limited.
" For a while during 1985 speculation was rife as to what would have
happened had the Natdems joined the campaign. It would certainly have
strengthened the whole movement organizationally. But what would have
been the attitude of Enrile, Ramos and the United States to such a
movement, and what kind of conflict and outcome would have resulted, are
the questions most commonly asked.
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The mass movement at the beginning of the post-Marcos
period was thus characterized by three important features. First, it
had established a powerful tradition of organized and militant
mobilization amongst the people. It was this (in conjunction with
the armed struggle in the countryside) which had tipped the balance
in bringing an end to Marcos's rule and installing Aquino.
Secondly, after making major headway in establishing a broad unity
during the 1983-85 period, the movement had become divided
again in the last days of Marcos. Thirdly, as a reflection of the new
division, a greater level of spontaneity, disorganization and
ideological confusion prevailed amongst a significant section of the
mobilized masses. This was the basis for the emergence of Cory
Aquino as a popular leader. Only the BAYAN mass forces
remained well organized with a sustainable, though temporarily
curtailed, mobilizing capacity.
Chapter 2
The Movement During the Interregnum from Revolution
to Elections: February 1986-May 1987
It was recognized among mass movement organizations that the role
mass mobilizations had played in the overthrow of Marcos provided
opportunities for the expansion of the 'parliament-of-the-streets'.
They wished to ensure that the reforms they had campaigned for
under Marcos, such as land reform and an end to human rights
abuses, would be implemented. There was a majority view that the
February victory for 'people's power' should be consolidated, and
various initiatives were launched to sustain the momentum and
strengthen the mass movement, although a minority drifted away
from mobilizational politics altogether. Among the first initiatives
were those aimed at regrouping the mass movement after the
divisiveness of the election campaign of 1986.
Post-revolution coalition initiatives
The 'participating' mass movement groups could be divided into
three categories. First, there were groups which fully supported
Aquino because they agreed with her election platform. These were
mainly Socdem groups, organized in BANDILA but also included
some of the non-aligned Libdems. Secondly, there were groups
which had emerged only during the campaign itself on the basis of
strong personal support for Aquino. They were usually referred to
as the 'Coryistas', and included groups such as Cory's Crusaders,
VICTORY and the Cory Aquino for President Movement (Abinales
1986; interview with Francisco Nemenzo, July 1986). Few of
them lasted for more than a few months after Aquino came to
power. Lastly, there were groups which had supported Aquino as
a tactical move. They saw the election campaign as a period of anti-
dictatorship mobilization, and participated both in the hope of
isolating Marcos and furthering their propaganda work within the
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movement.1 These groups formed the nationalist bloc within the
pro-Aquino campaign.
The main organizations in the nationalist bloc were
KAAKBAY and the Independent Caucus. The Independent Caucus
was formed during the 1985 BAYAN congress. It comprised
various intellectuals, trade union leaders, student groups, and
radical Christian groups who were in agreement with the Natdems
on key policy issues, such as land reform and removal of the US
bases but disagreed on questions of strategy and tactics. They
emphasized the need to work within the unorganized, spontaneous,
pro-Aquino formations and claimed that such a strategy necessitated
a firm and clear policy of 'critical support' for Aquino and some
tolerance of the unorganized character of the pro-Aquino forces.
The main disagreement in 1985 was over the question of the
election boycott. The other major difference was the Independent
Caucus's open support for socialism.2 The Independent Caucus
eventually transformed itself from a coalition of groups and
individuals into a pre-party formation based on individual
1 The most comprehensive explanation of 'critical participation' as a tactic
emanating from these circles is Participation Without Illusions
Resolution on the Special Elections of February 7, 1986 of the Filipino
Marxist League (FML). The FML is a small Marxist underground group
influential in radical groups outside the broad national democratic
movement The FML is based on a fusion of the Communist Party of the
Philippines-7th Column and the Marxist-Leninist Group. The former is a
breakaway from the CPP, the latter a breakaway group from the old party,
the PKP.
The Independent Caucus/BISIG program is outlined in the document
Socialist Vision. This was circulated in draft form during the Independent
Caucus period and adopted as the main policy document of BISIG at
BISIG's founding congress on 25 May 1986 (see BISIG 1987:1-24).
There has also always been a link between national democracy and
socialism. The first work to popularize national democracy was Jose
Maria Sison's On National Democracy, a collection of three talks
delivered during 1966 and 1967. In the third of these Sison argues
primarily that national democracy in the Philippines will lay the material
base for the broadest united front to achieve the necessary nationalist and
democratic reforms, such as land reform, basic democratic rights and the
development of national industry (Sison 1987).
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membership. It was called the Bukluran para sa Ikauunlad ng
Sosyalistang Isip at Gawa (Union for Advancement of Socialist
Thought and Action), or BISIG (To Strive). The main leaders of
Independent Caucus/BISIG are Francisco Nemenzo, Randy David,
the militant Christian socialist, Ronald Llamas, and National
Federation of Labour leader, Bong Malonzo.
BANDILA groups, the Independent Caucus, and the
spontaneous pro-Aquino formations quickly formed an alliance
called the Lakas Ng Sambayan (People's Power), usually referred
to as LAKAS. The basic thrust of the LAKAS manifesto was
progressive and populist. The following excerpt captures its
general character:
The Popular Revolution involved the seizure of state
power by the people; it was essentially a political act.
However, it remains unfinished. To become a social
revolution, social relations and social structures need to
be transformed. Remnants of the old authoritarian order
need to be dismantled to pave the way for the creation of
a new social order. To deepen democracy and create a
just society, the participation of the people must be
effectively encouraged and harnessed.
To accomplish these tasks, the peoples' power must now
be systematically articulated and translated into a
cohesive, organized and sustained force which will
promote popular democracy, national sovereignty, justice
and equity.
The logic of the majority must prevail and the interests of
the working class must be advanced.
President Aquino's government, installed by extra-
constitutional means and meta-legal processes, must
rebuild popular democracy through the same invincible
power of the people {Lakas Ng Sambayan, 2 March
1986, typescript).
LAKAS, however, did not develop into an effective
organization. It is unlikely that all its member groups fully
understood and supported its manifesto. The formulation of the
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manifesto and the general articulation of radical policies was
ideologically dominated by the KAAKBAY/Independent Caucus
bloc, supported by a small, left-wing grouping amongst the
Socdems, led by Florencio Abad. Nemenzo and David, and
possibly Abad, became the main theorists for the coalition. They
were the only grouping with a developed analysis of the situation
which the mass movement now faced.
Perhaps more important was the emergence of a second axis
of conflict within the movement, between parliamentarians and
'popular democrats'. The commitment of some sectors of LAKAS
to the militant 'parliament-of-the-streets' politics was weakening.
These groups assented to the rhetoric of the radical manifesto, while
their political practice moved further and further away from it.
During her election campaign and in the days immediately
afterwards, Aquino had exhorted the people to organize themselves
in order to continue the struggle for reforms. By March, she had
shifted the emphasis to that of restoring constitutional democracy.
Her concept of a return to democracy entailed no major structural
reforms and no role for extra-parliamentary mobilizations in
achieving social reforms. This became evident in March when she
proclaimed the 'Freedom Constitution'. This was, however, a
temporary measure and in April a Constitutional Commission (Con-
Com) was established. The Con-Com comprised a majority of
people who were not committed to 'popular democracy', and the
final draft of the constitution provided only lip-service to the role of
the mass organizations. There were no concrete mechanisms to
institutionalize their role, except for a provision (Art.vi Sec.5(ii))
giving the president the right to appoint 25 sectoral representatives
to the 250-member House of Representatives. The backbone of the
anti-Marcos movement thus stood to get a maximum of only 10 per
cent of the seats, providing Aquino made such appointments.
Three months after Congress opened, Aquino had appointed only
four sectoral representatives none of whom came from the large,
active mass organizations.
The majority of BANDILA and the Coryistas accepted
Aquino's framework of party-based, parliamentary democracy. The
more recently formed pro-Cory groups quickly faded away, as
there was no more need for them if there was to be no more extra-
parliamentary mobilizations.
Many of the Socdem leaders accepted positions in the new
government or were proposed as possible candidates for an Aquino
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senatorial team. Butz Aquino and Teofisto Guingona, for example,
both took on government responsibilities. Butz Aquino became the
government's negotiator with the rebel group of NPA-renegade
Conrado Balweg in the Cordilleras and the Moro rebels in the
south. Guingona became a member of Cabinet and, at one time,
head of the government's negotiating team in the ceasefire talks
with the NDF. Both were later elected as pro-Aquino senators.
Even activist figures and former political prisoners, such as Marito
Canonigo, accepted positions; in Canonigo's case in the
Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor. With this closer
identification with the government went an acceptance of what was
evolving as its fundamental political objective: the restoration of a
stable party system through a process of legitimation, involving the
ratification of a new constitution and the holding of elections.3
This was not a surprising development. From the beginning,
Aquino's political platform was ambiguous, even contradictory.
On the one hand, she promised a number of social, economic and
political reforms (Schirmer and Shalom 1987:338-343). Her
January 16 speech, 'Program of Social Reforms', for example,
promised big changes in land ownership and workers' conditions.
These were stated as her two highest priorities. On the other hand,
Aquino was moving to reinstate the political system that existed
before martial law and which was based on competition among the
traditional political parties; parties representing those social forces
which were resolutely opposed to the social and economic, if not
political, reforms Aquino said she intended to introduce* The mass
movement organizations had become the backbone of the
opposition to Marcos precisely because of the class character of the
traditional parties, which relied ultimately on landlord-military
partnerships in the countryside and business-military partnerships
in the towns, and consequently had participated only half-heartedly
in the mass movement.
In an interview with Canonigo in July 1986, he stated that he thought two
terms for Aquino would enable stabilization of the party parliamentary
system.
For analysis of parties and their social base in the Philippines see Julie
Sison (1986) and Landa (1986).
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LAKAS also failed in its attempt to build an alliance with the
Natdems, the largest and organizationally strongest element of the
mass movement. Given the level of disagreement that existed
during the election campaign, the inclusion of the Natdems
remained a sensitive issue. Additionally, the increasingly
conservative stance of the Socdem majority and the Coryistas
proved a major obstacle. The left wing of LAKAS, especially
BISIG, made attempts to prepare the way for an eventual linkage
with the Natdems by supporting inclusion in LAKAS of those
sections of the Natdem network which were not so closely
identified with the election boycott.
There were two major Natdem groups which had not
participated in the boycott: Volunteers for Popular Democracy
(VPD) and KADENA. VPD had been formed on the initiative of
two released political prisoners who had been active in the
underground National Democratic Front, Ed De la Torre and
Horacio 'Boy' Morales. De la Torre was allegedly founding
chairman of the Christians for National Liberation (CNL), an
affiliate of the NDF. Morales was allegedly chairman of the NDF at
the time of his arrest (Almendral 1984; Friends of Boy Morales
n.d.). VPD represents a small group of activists with a particular
concern for re-establishing an effective coalition between the
Natdems and the activist and leftist wings of the Socdems and
Libdems. They see the elaboration of a 'transitional program'
which can unite these forces as a high priority task. They refer to
this transitional program as the 'popular democratic' program. As
both De la Torre and Morales were in prison during the election
campaign, and were known to oppose the boycott decision, some
Socdems and Libdems have a less sectarian attitude towards them
than towards other Natdem figures (interviews with De la Torre and
Morales, July 1984; VPD 1986, 1987). KADENA was also a
lesser target of anti-Natdem sectarianism because it was, through its
chairman, Joey Flores, the first to publicly criticize the boycott
campaign after the elections. Apparently some sections of
KADENA itself did not boycott (see Florey in Ang Katipunan,
October 1986).
After some debate and discussion, KADENA was let into
LAKAS and Morales and De la Torre became observers. However,
due to the weakening commitment to the coalition amongst the
conservative Socdem and Coryista groups, this bridgehead never
led to an expansion of LAKAS, whose base dwindled to that of an
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alliance between BISIG and a small group of left wing social
democrats. Founded in March 1986, by May LAKAS had virtually
ceased activity.
The VPD group, never having been fully accepted into
LAKAS because of the hostility of the more conservative Socdems,
also took its own initiative. In Manila, it helped establish the Metro
Manila People's Council (MMPC). Using Aquino's call
immediately after the elections for the people to organize, VPD and
other Natdem forces began organizing local suburban councils on
which sat representatives of various sectoral and political groups.
The MMP was also able to attract BISIG, left-wing Socdem
individuals and various new and independent groups. It had a
much firmer base than LAKAS because it was able to work more
closely with the strong, Natdem, sectoral organizations. At the
1986 independence day rally it mobilized 30,000 people (interview
with De la Torre and Morales, July 1986; interview with De la
Torre, Direct Action 5 November 1986). MMPC continued to
exist until early 1987. However, it never became a major political
group. The energies of the National Democratic movement were
taken up meeting the constitutional and electoral initiatives of the
Aquino government.
Meanwhile, there had been a certain amount of demoralization
within the Natdem movement following the failure of the boycott
campaign. This was especially the case in the cities, where the
mass movement was the basic focus of the Natdem's work. As
Lean Alejandro said in his report to the BAYAN second congress:
'many believed BAYAN would fall apart' (Alejandro 1986:12). In
the countryside, the backbone of the opposition had always been
the underground NDF and the NPA. While legal radical
organizations did exist they were, and probably still are, of
secondary importance. The impact of the overthrow of Marcos was
felt less by the peasant population in the countryside because the
Aquino government did not begin any real reorganization of the
Armed Forces nor any effective disarming of the private armies of
the landlord class. While these remained intact, political changes in
Manila had little effect on the political plight of the peasant masses.
The urban Natdem movement quickly revived and began a
number of projects. There was a thoroughgoing assessment of past
policies and the current situation. In terms of membership and
cohesion of organization, the BAYAN forces in the cities had
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remained basically intact. No sector suffered any major losses or
disruption, with the partial, and temporary, exception of KADENA.
By mid- 1986, then, the new political map of the active mass
movement had become clearer. The main groups were BAYAN,
VPD, BISIG, and the left-wing of the Socdems, which had
gravitated around a group called Pandayan (Pandayan para sa
Sosyalistang Pilipinas).
In July and August there was an attempt to forge these groups
into a major alliance in response to events surrounding the so-called
'Manila Hotel Siege'. In July, supporters of the deposed President
Marcos, including elements of the Armed Forces, took over the
Manila Hotel and swore in Marcos 's vice-presidential candidate,
Arturo Tolentino as acting president. They then called on the
people and the Armed Forces to support them - a kind of parody of
the February Revolution. From the beginning, the attempt was a
farce, with no chance of success. Marcos had been completely
discredited and there was no possibility of any significant section of
the AFP or the population rallying behind a call for his return.
Other incidents surrounding the affair gave the mass
movement greater cause for concern. It became apparent that
Defense Minister Enrile and his military advisers, under Colonel
Gregorio Honasan, were aware of the Marcos loyalists' plans yet
did not warn the government. They even made public statements
praising the Marcos group's anti-communist stance and indicated
that they did not feel that military action should be taken against
them. Enrile and Honasan used this opportunity to win the
sympathy of the Marcos supporters while showing the Aquino
government that there was disenchantment within the Ministry of
Defense, where it was felt that the government was not being
sufficiently 'anti-communist'. Enrile and Honasan's statements
were given further potency when AFP chief-of- staff, Ramos,
decided to 'discipline' the troops who had taken part in the putsch
by making them do thirty push-ups.
These actions by Enrile, Honasan and then Ramos gave rise
to fears of a rapprochement between the pro-Marcos section of the
military and the section that had defected to Aquino in February. It
appeared that the unifying factor might be a move towards greater
repression. Most of the mass movement feared that any anti-
communist crackdown would also hit the legal mass movement. It
also threatened the Aquino government's initiative in seeking a
ceasefire with the NDF (Mamot 1987).
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In response to these developments the Coalition for the
Defence and Preservation of Democracy (CDPD) was formed. It
included thirty-five affiliated groups, most of which were, in turn,
either affiliated to, inspired by, or represented, BAYAN, BISIG,
VPD or Pandayan. Amongst the thirty-five signatories to the
CDPD manifesto were Nemenzo (BISIG), Florenco Abad
(Pandayan, signing for LAKAS), Etta Rosales (BAYAN), Lisa
Dacanay (Nationalist Alliance) and Efram Moncupa (VPD).s A rally
on 23 July was attended by over 40,000 people (Ang Bayan,
August 1986). However the CDPD was unable to maintain its
momentum. The Aquino government gained the upper hand, at
least temporarily, over the military rightists and this reduced the
need for a coalition. At the same time, many of the affiliated
organizations were preoccupied with internal organizational
consolidation.
Those sections of the mass movement which remained active
and supportive of mobilizational politics tended to coalesce into two
wings. The National Democratic wing, organized primarily
through BAYAN, remained the largest. The left-wing of the former
LAKAS coalition formed the nucleus of the second, minority,
wing. But while the two wings were primarily concerned with
internal consolidation, they also tried, wherever possible, to
collaborate on specific issues and campaigns.
The National Democratic forces
Despite the failure of the boycott campaign, in the months after the
February Revolution BAYAN remained the strongest single element
of the mass movement. Its strength lay in its roots in the Filipino
working class and peasantry, particularly through the KMU and
KMP.
The national council ofBAYAN met on 6 and 7 March, soon
after the February Revolution. At that meeting, those who had left
The CDPD manifesto, dated 15 July 1986 was published as a full page
advertisement in Malaya, 21 July 1986.
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over the boycott issue, such as ex-Senator Tanada, returned and
resumed their positions. Reconciliation was made possible by the
self-critical approach of the boycott supporters and the shared view
that most of the social and political problems of the country
remained. Land reform, nationalization of foreign industry,
support for local business people, debt repudiation, closure of the
Bataan nuclear plant, and removal of the US miltary bases still had
to be fought for. Nor was it clear there would be an end to human
rights abuses and other problems of militarization. BAYAN's
provincial branches reported continuing harassment of their
activists. According to Alejandro's report to the second national
congress (Alejandro 1986:18), 150 BAYAN activists had been
killed in the previous year. Last-minute defection by the majority of
the AFP had saved the AFP from a purge of human rights violators
and it was clear very early that there would be no trial of military
officers for human rights abuses. The Presidential Commission on
Human Rights (PCHR) was not given prosecuting powers. In the
Cagayan Valley, in northern Luzon, the military launched a major
counter-insurgency campaign code-named Oplan Mammayan.
During this, many abuses took place and large numbers of villagers
were forced to flee (ibid.:24). BAYAN provincial leaders reported
that many of their supporters could see no change since the
February Revolution. Amongst both boycotters and those who had
left BAYAN to participate in the elections, there was a conviction
that BAYAN was still needed.
The organization set its first tasks within a general framework
of support for the Aquino government. The BAYAN national
council congress meeting of 5 March 1986 adopted a policy of
'vigilant and principled support' (ibid.:\6). This was essentially a
'critical support' policy. Their immediate demand was for the
continued dismantling of the remnants of the dictatorship's
institutions, including the purging of the AFP. Demands for a wide
range of reforms which BAYAN had traditionally supported were
reaffirmed.
The policy of 'vigilant and principled support' was based
upon an analysis of the incomplete nature of the February
Revolution and the contradictory composition of the new
government. According to BAYAN:
What emerged from the ruins of the ousted regime could
not yet really be considered a people's government,
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despite the unquestionably democratic manner by which it
was installed and no matter how it may be called, because
political power never really did pass into the hands of the
people. The exercise of People's Power installed a
government that has yet to institutionalize and guarantee
power to the people (ibid.:24).
BAYAN identified three main political forces operating in the
country: liberals, fascists and progressives. It saw the government
as a 'rather bizarre coalition of liberals and fascists', as opposed to
which were the progressives. The liberals included both the
established (anti-Marcos) political parties and the 'reformist
politicians, business and middle-class activists, and representatives
of the Church hierarchy':
... they control the civilian bureaucracy and enjoy popular
support. As such, they are obliged to promise reforms,
no matter how cosmetic, and democratic space to the
people. They are locked in struggle with the fascist forces
for effective control of the whole state apparatus
(ibid.:26).
The fascists comprised the pro-Marcos forces, including provincial
warlords, and the Enrile and Ramos factions of the AFP. They
were seen to control the AFP. While General Ver had fled, and
Aquino had begun to retire a number of overstaying generals, the
command structure of the military remained essentially the same.
Enrile, who, as a martial law administrator, had arrested activists in
the past, remained Defense minister, and Ramos, who had been
head of the most abusive arm of the forces, the Philippine
Constabulary (PC), was now AFP chief-of-staff.
The progressive forces comprised the bulk of the 'parliament-
of-the-streets' in combination with the underground. They included
the nationalists, progressive politicians and middle- class activists,
democratic organized labour, peasantry, students, women and other
politicized sectors, and the revolutionary groups (ibid.). The
progressives were located primarily outside the government and had
a common interest in preserving the atmosphere of democracy that
existed immediately after the February Revolution.
In discussing possible future scenarios for the Philippines,
the BAYAN analysis saw three basic possibilities, each reflecting a
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victory for the three forces. There was, however, a general
scepticism as to whether the liberal forces would be able to
consolidate any kind of victory. The National Democratic forces
viewed the Aquino experiment as a temporary phenomenon; they
were convinced that because the new government would not
seriously attempt any thoroughgoing socio-economic reforms, the
social dynamics of polarization would reassert themselves.
For the moment, however, BAYAN set itself tasks which
took into account the current ascendancy and popularity of the
liberal forces. It identified as crucial:
.... the process of Constitution-making, the ceasefire
negotiations and possible political settlement, and the
respective sectoral struggles of the basic sectors,
especially the workers, farmers and students (ibid.:27).
The second national BAYAN congress also emphasized that
intervention in these areas as part of a struggle to achieve victory for
the 'progressive forces' must be accompanied by the maximum
possible collaboration between the progressive and liberal forces.6
Even after the election of Aquino, the mobilizational capacity
of the BAYAN forces was quite formidable. BAYAN claimed a
national membership of approximately two million. The KMU
accounted for 600,000 and the KMP another 100,000. The rest
came from the approximately 1000 provincial-based organizations
that had affiliated to BAYAN. In 1986, tens of thousands attended
the KMU-organized May 1 celebrations, at which not only Aquino,
but also CPP founder, Jose Maria Sison, and NPA founder
Bernabe 'Dante' Buscayno, appeared.
In July, 15,000 attended an anti-US military bases
demonstration in front of the US embassy in Manila. A small
contingent of BISIG forces also attended. The rally was the first to
be violently dispersed by the Aquino government. The police broke
up the rally using tear gas, smoke bombs, and rocks. Four
demonstrators were shot and several beaten up. The rallyists later
returned, however, this time led by the eighty-nine year old
BAYAN chairman, Tafiada, and several members of the
Constitutional Commission. General Lim, in charge of the police at
the rally, was reluctantly forced to allow it to continue. (The author
observed the rally, dispersal and re-assembly on 4 July 1986).
There was also a huge BAYAN mobilization (observers claimed
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one million) at the funeral of the murdered leader of the KMU,
Rolando Olalia. Almost all of this crowd was mobilized by
BAYAN and other Natdem forces.
The main challenge that BAYAN faced was the limited
opportunity to reach out to the unorganized masses who were still
looking to Aquino. The mechanism for this had been the
'parliament-of-the-streets'. The splitting of the movement before
and during the boycott, the defection to Aquino's parliamentary
program by important sections of the Socdems, and the high level
of support for the Aquino government from the unorganized masses
and their middle-class leaders, all contributed to the demobilization
of the 'parliament-of-the-streets'. Organizations like the KMU and
KMP continued to grow, and BAYAN was still able to make use of
the press to reach sectors of the public. The demobilization of the
mass movement, however, closed off the best point of access to the
semi-radicalized, now politically inactive, masses.
This problem was ameliorated somewhat during 1986 with
the formation of a new political party, Partido ng Bayan (People's
Party, PnB), to participate in national and local elections. The idea
of launching a party committed to the National Democratic program
was not new. It had been discussed as early as 1979. In 1985,
before the US had pressured Marcos into a snap presidential
election, discussion was already underway about the possibility of
forming a new party or parties to compete in local elections. There
had been calls for the formation of a labour party from within the
trade union movement and calls for a peasant party from activists
working within the peasant movement. BAYAN itself was
originally intended to develop into a political party; this did not
happen because in many provinces members of existing parties who
had gravitated toward the National Democratic program and had
joined BAYAN continued to maintain their allegience to the old
parties, such as PDP-Laban and even UNIDO.6
Provincial politics is very complex. The national leadership of traditional
policial parties, in some provincial cities and towns, have lost their grip
on the local organizations. This has allowed the emergence of younger,
maverick activists in these parties. Some of these have been attracted to
the radical programs of BAYAN. This trend can also be found amongst
provincial business people who are attracted by the Natdem emphasis on
building up a nationally-owned industry. The Filipino Left does not
advocate wholesale nationalization of industry, especially not of locally-
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After the overthrow of Marcos and the emerging possibility of
new congressional elections, these calls became stronger. They
were supported by a number of former political prisoners released
by Aquino. Jose Maria Sison, Bernabe 'Dante' Buscayno, Horacio
'Boy' Morales and Alan Jasminez were all deeply involved. When
a preparatory committee was formed to organize the launching of
the new party, Sison was named as chairman, Jasminez as
secretary-general, and Morales as head of the finance committee.
Partido ng Bayan held its founding congress on 30 August
1986. It elected as chairman KMU leader Rolando Olalia, and as
secretary-general, Alan Jasminez. Buscayno, who received a
standing ovation, gave the opening address. Sison delivered the
main political report which was adopted as an official document of
the party (Sison 1987). Over one thousand delegates from all over
the country attended the congress, which was also celebrated with a
rally of over ten thousand supporters (see Ike Suarez in Mr and Ms
5-11 September 1986). The party's founding membership came
primarily from the worker and peasant sectors, with a smaller
number from the middle class. Its constitution provided that all
decision-making bodies at all levels must have a 60 per cent
representation from the workers and peasants (interview with Alan
Jasminez, July 1986).
With 'parliament-of-the-streets' politics in the doldrums and
elections in the offing, the formation of the new party provided
another potential bridge to the unorganized masses. It projected the
National Democratic cause to the whole of society on a multi-
sectoral basis, counterposing its program to that of the new
government. Naturally, it placed considerable emphasis on
institutionalizing 'Peoples Power' and pluralist politics, on land
reform and labour reform, and on the removal of the US military
bases in the Philippines. To the extent it represented the National
Democratic cause as an alternative to the government, its ability to
attract the semi-radicalized people who looked to Aquino was
limited. However, it raised the profile of the Natdem movement
significantly.
owned industry. (Interview with Alan Jasminez, Secretary-General, Partido
Ng Bayan, July 1986).
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The National Democratic forces were also able to consolidate
their sectoral organizations, particularly among workers and
peasants.
In the Philippines, trade unions are organized at the factory
level. A trade union established at the factory constitutes a single,
independent union. Many of these then form federations, but
others remain independent. The federations may affiliate to a trade
union centre. There are two major centres, the KMU and the old
pro-Marcos Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP).
There are also five big independent federations and a number of
provincial and industry-based alliances. These centres and
federations often compete to affiliate unions. Elections are held in
factories, where workers choose which union they want to
represent them. A key measure of the growth of a federation or
centre is its success in winning 'certification elections', as they are
called.7
The winner during 1986 and 1987 was the KMU. It affiliated
a number of unions to KMU federations or directly to the KMU
(interviews with KMU and non-KMU trade union leaders and
organizers, August-September 1987). It has continued to provide
the largest numbers of people at mobilizations, though the number
of strikes declined slightly during 1986 due to a moderating of
political actions after BAYAN adopted a position of 'principled
support' for the government. (KMU, for example, adopted a three
month strike moratorium.)
The strength of the KMU was revealed more clearly when it
launched its first welgang bayan in the post-Marcos period. This
occurred in August 1987 following the government's decision to
raise oil and kerosene prices. In a series of rallies, demonstrations
and strikes, the welgang bayan completely paralyzed Manila's
transport system and brought to a standstill many factories and
offices. The phenomenon was repeated in other cities, reflecting
The major alliances are: the Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied
Services (TUPAS); Federation of Free Workers; KATIPUNAN;
Philippines Social Security Labour Union (PSSLU) and Garment, Textile,
Cordage and Allied workers in the Philippines (GATCORD). A more
recent coalition of independent unions is Lakas Manggagawa (Workers
Power). See Institute for Labour Research and Documentation (1985).
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the combination of organizational depth and the popularity of the
issue.
The KMP was also adjusting to the post-Marcos situation.
The KMP was formed in July 1985. Like the KMU, it is a
federation, its membership consisting of peasant and farmer
organizations, many of which operate on a provincial or district
level, sometimes covering farmers working in particular crops. The
activities of the farmer organizations usually started with welfare
and education and broadened into representative organizations
confronting landlords and government. In some areas, where
peasant rebellion and conflict with landlords have been endemic
throughout the twentieth century, there has developed a strong
tradition of militancy. The KMP had, in fact, been in the making
for over a decade.
After the overthrow of Marcos, KMP activities escalated on
two major fronts. First, there was an increased demand for land
reform. Rallies and forums were held. The peasant organizations
had developed a tradition of mass actions in the form of 'people's
camps' before 1985. During 1986 they organized several camps
outside the Ministry of Agrarian Reform and the Ministry of
Agriculture. There were at least three marches to Malacanang
Palace, though on no occasion did anyone from the Presidential
Office meet with the farmers. At the biggest of the rallies, marines
fired on the demonstrators wounding over a hundred protesting
farmers and killing over twenty.8 It was only after widespread
criticism of the government following this massacre that a dialogue
between the KMP leaders and the government took place.
The second major front was in the countryside itself. One of
the least controversial aspects of the proposed land reform was that
abandoned and unused lands should be made available for use by
landless peasants. Even this was resisted fairly successfully by
anti-land-reform elements within the government. However KMP-
affiliated organizations soon occupied land and began handing it
over to landless peasants. Some farm plots were obtained with the
permission of the owner, some were unilaterally occupied. By late
1986 the KMP was claiming that it had occupied over fifty
A full account of this incident, known as the Mendiola Massacre, can be
found in Maglipon (1986).
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thousand hectares of land (interview with Rafael Soviano,
secretary-general, KMP, August 1986).
In the countryside, peasant organizations were in frequent
confrontation with landlords. The single, largest group of victims
of 'salvagings', disappearances and other forms of terror has
always been grassroots organizers in the rural areas. One of the
biggest farm-worker unions is the National Federation of Sugar
Workers (NFSW), which is based in Negros. During 1986 and
1987 several of their organizers were killed and a number of their
members arrested and tortured (interview with national, provincial
and barrio leaders of NFSW in Negros, September 1986). NFSW
also became active in running a farm-plot program on abandoned
and idle lands.
One development during late 1986 indicated just how great
was the potential for outreach by the National Democratic forces.
In November, a ceasefire agreement was signed between the NDF
and the Aquino government. Among other things, the agreement
allowed for the opening of an NDF office in Manila. During this
period, NDF leaders Satur Ocampo, Antonio Zumel and Bobby
Malay-Ocampo, had free and frequent access to the media. They
attended the huge protest march for assassinated Partido ng Bayan
chairman, Rolando Olalia. The NDF was able to hold successful
rallies in many provincial cities and small towns. With its leaders
publicly visible and participating in peace talks the National
Democratic movement's potential to build itself into a popular
alternative to the government was momentarily revealed.
The ceasefire talks later broke off and relations between the
Aquino government and the NDF worsened. Aquino retained the
mantle of leadership. The challenge remained of building a broad,
progressive coalition which could become a new pole of attraction
for those that the Natdem organizations had not recruited but who
might become disillusioned with Aquino.
Minority radical forces
Ironically, it was the Socdem forces which found themselves less
intact after their successful participation in the presidential election
campaign. Despite the formal allegiance of the Socdem groups to
'social democracy' and socio-economic reform, the rallying cry of
the majority of the Socdem leadership never went much further than
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a call for the removal of Marcos. It was only a relatively small and
well organized wing of the Socdems that had consciously built up a
commitment to democratic socialist principles. As a consequence,
the overthrow of Marcos immediately undercut the Socdems' mass
base. The various organizations that emerged during the election
campaign, and which looked to the Socdems, soon disappeared.
Much of the Socdem leadership took positions in the government
and supported the move away from mobilizational politics. As
noted above, this was a major factor in the stillbirth of the LAKAS
coalition.
This tendency within the Socdem forces, however, gave
impetus to the growth of new radical formations. The most
important is BISIG. BISIG did not originate in the Socdem
movement, but was formed during the 1985 founding congress of
BAYAN, when various non-affiliated trade union, intellectual and
student activists coalesced. This small group considered itself
socialist or Marxist and radical, its members united in the idea that
the only solution to the problems of the Philippines was a socialist
one. Their perspective and their program are similar in many ways
to those of the Natdems. Different members of BISIG have
disagreements with the Natdems, depending on what section of the
mass movement they originally came from; there are former
Natdems, former Socdems, members of the old PKP who rejected
its collaboration with Marcos, but could not accept the Maoist-
influenced Natdem analysis of Filipino society, and a number of
other tendencies. The major disagreements are on questions of
strategy and tactics.
The overall perspective of BISIG is spelt out in its founding
document, Socialist Vision.. Its analysis of the post-Marcos
situation is set out in Beyond February: The Tasks ofSocialists. In
many ways, BISIG's summing up of the post-Marcos situation was
similar to BAYAN's:
... the people did not keep the power they won in the
February Revolution but handed it over to the liberal
bourgeoisie who, in turn, are bound to use it for their
own class interests. It is therefore illusory to expect the
new government, no matter how sincere and amiable
compared to its predecessor, to carry out the reforms to
meet the people's objective needs. The initiative for
meaningful reforms must come from the people
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themselves, and people's power or pressure politics will
have to be applied. The role of BISIG is to equip the
people with the skills to extract reforms from the liberal
government, and ultimately to wield power themselves
and build a socialist society ('Beyond February: The
Tasks of Socialists', in BISIG 1987).
The concrete tasks BISIG set were primarily oriented to
consolidating and building BISIG itself, seeking alliances with the
Natdems and Socdems, combatting the rightist elements in the new
government, and resisting any backsliding by the government as far
as the expanded 'democratic space' won by the revolution was
concerned. Organizational consolidation and coalition formation
were the central tasks. BISIG's small size and newness meant that
it could not undertake major sectoral campaigns. It has no
equivalent of KMU and KMP.
BISIG held its founding congress in May 1986. At that time
it had about 500 members, including the leaders of a number of
worker, student and urban poor organizations. It was able to
mobilize people for most of the key campaigns during 1986: the
May 1 rally, the July 4 demonstration in front of the US embassy,
June 21 Independence Day rally, and a rally held on August 21, the
anniversary of the assassination of Benigno Aquino. It also
mobilized several hundred people for the caravan, organized jointly
with the Natdem forces, which held protests in Angeles City against
the presence of US military bases in the Philippines. BISIG also
had active branches in Pampanga Province, especially in Angeles
City and small but active student groups on the campuses of the
University of the Philippines and the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines. Unlike BAYAN, BISIG was based on individual
membership.
The core of the BISIG leadership came from what is usually
called the independent Marxist stream. It included University of the
Philippines figures such as Francisco Nemenzo and Randy David.
However, with the polarization of the Socdems, a significant
section of the left wing of the Socdems joined BISIG. The major
organizations involved were the Christian Union of Socialists
(CRUS) and the militant Christian workers' group, KAMAO. This
gave BISIG its initial working-class base. Most of BISIG's trade
union leaders belonged to unions in which the Natdems were in the
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majority. In 1987 the large Socdem, urban poor organization
UMALUN, also left BANDILA to join BISIG.
One of BISIG's greatest strengths was in the ideological area,
where its leading writers influenced important publications. The
University of the Philippines magazines Diliman Review and
Kasarinlan are edited by Nemenzo and David respectively. They
are both widely read amongst the Left. Another strength of BISIG
is its ability to act as a bridge between Natdem and Socdem groups
in the building of alliances, a position it shared during 1986 with
the Natdem group, VPD. However, compared to the BAYAN
forces, BISIG remained a minor force during 1986 and 1987,
unable to initiate significant mobilizations by itself. Its major role
has been in coalition with other forces in providing a left leadership
to a range of smaller radical groups who have shared BISIG's
disagreements with the Natdems.
Social Democratic forces
Besides being drawn into government, the Social Democrats were
kept busy with internal organizational problems. This was less a
matter of consolidation than of proliferation. By mid- 1986 the
following legal Socdem organizations were acting more or less
independently from each other: the Philippines Democratic Socialist
Party (PDSP), the Federation of Social Democratic Movements
(FSDM), BANDILA and its affiliates such as ATOM, and a group
called KASAPI. Further, key Socdem figures such as Aquino and
Guingona were lining up as senatorial candidates for the new Lakas
Ng Bansa group being formed by Aquino for the congressional
elections. Other Socdem figures were later to join the Liberal Party
or PDP-Laban. As mentioned above, a left-wing formation joined
BISIG. Other groups were to follow the Christian Socialists and
KAMAO in 1987. The previously Socdem-oriented Young
Christian Workers joined BAYAN. There emerged new, leftist
tendencies which were unwilling to break away totally from the
Socdem camp but were moving closer to BISIG or BAYAN.
Underlying this proliferation of groups and splits was an
emerging polarization. Amongst the groups which stayed within
the Social Democratic milieu, the dividing lines became questions of
emphasis on mass work, on the need for alliances with other radical
forces, and on having a critical approach to the Aquino government.
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The majority of the Socdem forces, led by Butz Aquino and others,
supported a parliamentary approach, vied away from alliances with
the Natdems, and gave uncritical support to President Aquino.
These forces became concentrated in BANDILA and PDSP. The
leftist forces, while remaining active in those two organizations,
gravitated towards Pandayan, a small organization (according to its
leaders between 100-200 members, which was concentrated in the
trade unions).
Responding to Aquino's Legitimation Project: the
politics of ratification
The latter part of 1986 and the first five months of 1987 were
dominated by Aquino's attempts to shift the basis of her legitimacy
from popular revolution to a conventional electoral mandate. Her
main initiatives were the plebiscites to ratify the draft constitution,
the ceasefire with the NDF, and the congressional elections. Both
the National Democratic movement and the minority radical groups
became preoccupied with responding to these initiatives.
The Natdems and the minority wings of the organized mass
movement were involved in similar campaigns during the drafting
of the new constitution. Both lobbied members of the
Constitutional Commission (Con-Com) in order to obtain similar
provisions: the exclusion of foreign bases and nuclear weapons
from the Philippines; commitment to comprehensive land reform,
and the institutionalizing of the role of people's organizations in the
new political system.
However, the whole spectrum of policy issues came under
debate. BAYAN held a conference in June 1986, which was
attended by over a hundred delegates from around the country, to
formulate proposals to put to the Con-Com. Detailed policies were
developed on a wide range of policy questions, from how to
promote industrialization, to how to organize a citizen's army and
what system of parliamentary representation to apply. Strong
proposals for the protection of civil liberties were also put forward.9
These policies are set out in a number of stencilled documents which were
distributed at the conference. Final proposals were published in Malaya
newspaper during mid July.
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While mass mobilizational activity may have decreased during
this period, lobbying by BAYAN increased. This was a new form
of activity for the BAYAN forces, and was facilitated by the way in
which the Con-Com operated. The Con-Com set up a number of
standing committees to consider specific aspects of the constitution.
These travelled to different parts of the country and held public
hearings which became the focus of lobbying activities.
Delegations from various sectoral organizations and provincial
branches of BAYAN addressed the standing committees; often,
small demonstrations or pickets took place. BAYAN organizations
held press conferences and other forums in conjunction with the
public hearings. The best known of these public hearings was that
held by the standing committee looking into possible constitutional
provisions against foreign bases on Filipino soil. The hearing was
held on 4 July, American-Filipino Friendship Day. BAYAN
leaders ex-Senator Tahada and Etta Rosales spoke out against the
bases, as did BISIG vice-chairman Randy David. There were also
delegations of students carrying placards inside the hall. Outside,
over 10,000 people gathered for a march to the US embassy.
The basic thrust of.BAYAN's campaign was set out in the
widely distributed pamphlet, Fight for a Truly Pro-People
Constitution. Key sections included the following:
Full constitutional guarantees for the civil, political and
economic rights of the different social sectors - land
ownership for the peasants; unionists' rights,
employment, job security, humane working conditions,
higher wages for the workers; shelter and social security
for the urban poor; free, relevant and quality education
for the students; just pay and the right to organize for the
teachers; better business opportunities for nationalist
businessmen and Filipino entrepreneurs; equal rights for
women; social welfare for children and the aged;
autonomy and self-determination for all minority people.
Democratic representation of all sectors in government,
meaning their effective participation in all its policy
making bodies.
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A self-reliant economy upholding the national patrimony
above and beyond foreign powers and foreign capital.
A non-aligned foreign policy renouncing all wars of
conquest and upholding mutually beneficial relations with
all nations.
Genuine national security, removing all threats of war
and nuclear devastation posed by the US bases and use of
various military pursuits in the Philippines and abroad.
Nationalist mass-based, pro-people and non
discriminatory art, media and culture, promoting the
needs of the Filipino nation.
Although BISIG and Pandayan did not produce the same kind
of comprehensive documentation, they supported much the same
basic principles. BISIG's policy statements on other issues during
this period, such as those against privatization of Marcos- or crony-
owned businesses and in support of land reform, also followed
BAYAN's constitutional campaign.
One area of disagreement between BAYAN and BISIG
concerned the emphasis to be given to campaigning for proportional
representation for political parties, as opposed to direct
parliamentary representation for sectoral organizations. This was
also debated within the respective organizations. BAYAN's final
position supported sectoral representation to maximize participation
by mass organizations. While supporting this idea, BISIG called
for proportional representation in both houses of Congress as a
means of breaking the traditional two-party dominance of Congress
(author's observations of the BAYAN conference and BISIG
meetings held to discuss the constitution, Manila, June 1986).
The final draft of the constitution did not live up to the
expectations of the mass movement organizations. Except for those
who were moving towards an official alliance with the government,
virtually the entire mass movement was opposed to at least part of
the constitution's provisions. In the area of" civil liberties, there was
a number of new constitutional safeguards against the emergence of
another dictator. There was also commitment to principles of social
justice, land reform, and a nuclear-free Philippines. But many of
44 The Urban Mass Movement in the Philippines: 1983-87
these in-principle commitments were qualified. As this had been
the method used to thwart land reform programs ever since the
Philippines gained independence, scepticism was extremely high
amongst the organized groups.
While the mass movement was more or less united in its
criticisms, differences emerged on how to respond to the
constitutional plebiscite. The majority of the National Democratic
movement decided to campaign for a 'no' vote. The minority
radical groups and some National Democratic elements decided on a
'critical yes' campaign. This difference reflected the disagreement
over tactics that had occurred at the time of the election boycott in
January 1986.
BISIG, VPD and the left wing of the Social Democrats
considered that it was important to keep open lines of
communication with the semi-radicalized, unorganized, pro-Aquino
masses. Even at the end of 1986, their assessment was that Aquino
was still the focus of this unorganized, pro-reform, public opinion.
They considered that the best strategy was to call for a 'yes' vote
while running an education campaign pointing out the deficiencies
of the Constitution and reminding people that there was still a
struggle ahead.
The 'critical yes' group also saw the ratification of the
constitution as a necessary step to defend the government and the
democratic gains, such as the legal enshrinement of civil liberties,
that had been won since the February Revolution. By the end of
1986 there had already been two coup attempts: the Hotel Manila
Siege in June and the much more serious attempt involving Defence
Minister Enrile and Colonel Honasan in November. The political
forces involved in these coups were also campaigning against the
new Constitution. The 'critical yes' group considered that it was
necessary to indicate that popular opinion was against Enrile. (For
the BISIG view see BISIG 1987.)
BISIG, VPD and the left Socdems were able to rally a
number of the reform-oriented pro-Aquino groups to the 'critical
yes' cause. Over forty organizations eventually came together to
form the People's OUTCRY (People's Organizations United
Towards Critical Yes). Most came from the left wing of the non-
BAYAN mass movement. Apart from BISIG and VPD, key
groups were Pandayan, KAAKBAY and Metro-Manila People's
Council. Most of the other groups were linked in one way or
another with these organizations. The exceptions were the several
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Natdem groups which took a 'critical yes' stance despite their links
with BAYAN, which campaigned for a 'no'. These were
Nationalist Alliance, the University of the Philippines Chapter of
the League of Filipino Students, Association of Concerned
Teachers, No Nukes, and KADENA. Non-left Socdem groups,
such as the University of the Philippines Socdem student
organization UP-TUGON, also joined.10
While there was considerable debate within the National
Democratic movement, the majority of the Natdems decided to
campaign against the ratification of the new constitution. A key
aspect of their analysis was that Aquino had already won US
support for her government and the threat from the Enrile and
Marcos loyalists was not serious. Additionally, they saw the
Aquino government evolving in the same direction as that being
called for by Enrile himself and they were also sceptical about the
likelihood of the positive elements of the Constitution being
implemented. They thus saw Aquino's ratification campaign as a
means of legitimizing her increasingly conservative rule. Such
legitimation would, they thought, encourage her to violently
suppress those who operated outside the constitution, in particular
those on the Left. They held the view that the repression of the
poor would continue no matter what the constitution said. In
addressing some of the arguments that the 'critical yes' group was
putting forward, they asked, how much democracy would really
exist under the new constitution? The CPP articulated fairly clearly
the sentiments of many in the National Democratic movement:
But what democratic space and what democratic rights
are there really to speak of? Sincere elements from
among the middle forces appear to have been so
mesmerized by the initial spate of democratic reforms
that ensued upon the Aquino government's assumption
of power. Now they fail to recognize the fact that
economic and political power remains firmly in the
hands of the people's oppressors and exploiters, and
Philippines society continues to be dominated by US
10 The People's OUTCRY manifesto, A Callfor the Critical Ratification of
the Draft Constitution, 12 January 1987, was published as a leaflet
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imperialism. The Aquino regime and its imperialist
backers, meanwhile, harp so much on the restoration of
formal, democratic rights and processes after the
downfall of a regime of tyranny and open terror, even as
they steer clear of the more fundamental questions. . ..
Workers' rights continue to be violated in the interest of
'industrial peace' and a 'favourable climate for foreign
investment'. Urban poor settlers' and national
minorities' sites continue to be trampled on in the name
of 'development'. Peasants continue to be deprived of
their lands, and together with those resolutely asserting
their legitimate demands, continue to suffer from illegal
arrest and detention, torture and salvaging, bombing and
strafing, forced evacuation and hamletting (Ang Bayan
January 1987; also reprinted in Kasarinlan Vol. 2, No. 3
1987).
On this issue, however, Aquino firmly retained the initiative.
The final result was a national vote of well over 75 per cent for
'yes'. Outside Ilocos and Cagayan Valley - the traditional
bailiwicks of Marcos and Enrile - the vote was often over 85 per
cent. The National Democratic movement's 'no' campaign was
constrained by a number of factors. The main one was that the
Aquino government continued to be seen by many people as the
only short-term alternative to a return to power by pro-Marcos
forces, if not by Marcos himself. It should be remembered that
tied-up with a ratification of the constitution was the provision that
Aquino remain for her full six-year term. A 'no' vote was seen by
many as a vote against Aquino's continuing rule. It is certainly true
that a win for the 'no' vote would have created a constitutional and
political crisis.
The stability of the government became an even more central
issue when in February 1987, just weeks before the plebiscite there
was another coup attempt by pro-Marcos forces. Pro-Marcos
officers and troops occupied Channel 7 television station. Even
though no other sections of the AFP were involved, the fact that
AFP Chief-of-Staff Ramos was so hesitant to use force against the
rebels rekindled fears of a rapprochement between the military and
the pro-Marcos and Enrile forces.
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The 'yes' vote was thus much more a vote against the Right
than a vote for the constitution. Indeed, it is extremely unlikely that
more than a tiny percentage of the population knew what was in the
62-page document. The low 'no' vote outside the Ilocos and
Cagayan areas indicated, however, that the National Democratic
movement, both legal and underground, had not succeeded in
convincing large sections of the population. It is less clear what
effect their criticisms of specific provisions in the constitution had
on people's consciousness. What percentage of the 'yes' vote was
actually a 'critical yes' vote, whether based on the Natdem or the
People's OUTCRY critique of the constitution, is impossible to tell.
Aquino had been in power for only one year and many voters were
prepared to give her the benefit of the doubt.
The ceasefire negotiations
As discussed earlier, the period of ceasefire from November 1986
to February 1987 saw a highly successful propaganda drive by the
NDF representatives, Antonio Zumel, Satur Ocampo and Bobby
Malay. This was mirrored in many provinces where local NDF
negotiators also emerged into public view.n Unlike the
government, the NDF had clear and firm proposals to solve the
country's social and economic problems. In the area of land
reform, for example, it had a sophisticated package with specific
arrangements for each agricultural crop while the government was
floundering around unable to say what kind of land reform it would
support. (Nine months later when at least four bills had been
presented to Congress, Aquino still had not indicated support for
any particular land reform program.) The NDF made considerable
headway during this period in winning popular support.
The ceasefire had taken place in the context of Aquino's
election promise to try to end the 'insurgency' by removing the root
causes. For the revolutionary movement this meant instituting a
comprehensive land reform, nationalizing foreign enterprise and
1 1 This is documented for Negros in the film Negros: Social Volcano (North-
South films, London). See also Romi M. Gatuslaw, 'Making the ceasefire
work in region X' in Mr and Mrs 23-29 January 1987.
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building up local, private and state industry, and institutionalizing
democratic reforms while dismantling the remaining structures of
the dictatorship, such as the para-military forces and private armies.
It soon became apparent, however, that the government considered
the 'root causes' of unrest could be solved at a purely individual
level. It offered amnesty, land and money to individual guerrillas
who agreed to give up fighting. Furthermore, the government took
the view that the AFP had already been reformed. The NDF saw
the AFP as the major bastion of the Marcos dictatorship and
demanded that it be purged of those officers who had known
records of serious human rights abuses. This was a call echoed by
many other groups, including church and legal-aid organizations.
Provincial church and human rights groups were still handling
evacuees who were fleeing the activities of the military in the
provinces for the relative safety of Manila. In responding to the
NDF's demand for reform in the AFP, the Government Negotiating
Panel (n.d.:62) stated:
Today's soldier is a new military man. His value of
loyalty is to country and constitution - not to a dictator.
He is the protector of people, not their oppressor. He is a
professional, not a politician - and the people already
recognise this despite the aberration of a few.
This refusal of the government to acknowledge a continuing
civil liberties problem resulting from the activities of the AFP meant
that the essential minimum conditions for a continuation of the
negotiations were not present. The government's strategy was to
entice the NDF, with amnesty and land, into participation in open,
legal politics. This was possible, in the government's eyes,
because 'the new military man' was no longer the oppressor. The
NDF, on the other hand, observing continuing military harassment
of peasant and worker organizations in the countryside, was
hesitant. The assassination of the chairman of the Partido ng Bayan
and the arrest of a member of the NDF negotiating panel during this
period no doubt also added to their concerns. Then in January
1987 there occurred the massacre of peasant demonstrators in front
of the presidential palace. This prompted the resignation of ex-
Senator Jose Diokno from the Government Negotiating Panel.
Following the ratification of the new constitution in the
February plebiscite, the government hardened its position by
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demanding that negotiations take place within the framework of the
constitution. It also indicated that it would continue with its
amnesty and rehabilitation policy. The first demand meant the NDF
giving up negotiation on land reform, national industrialization and
the reform of the AFP. The constitution gave no authority to the
president to conduct such negotiations, such policies being left to
the decisions of Congress.
At the end of the 60-day ceasefire, the NDF panel sent a letter
to the government panel stating its conclusion that the government
was not seriously concerned with the basic question of 'addressing
the root causes of the popular armed resistance' (NDF letter, signed
by Ocampo, Zumel and Salas, reprinted in Kasarinlan, Vol. 2, No.
4 1987, p. 80). The NDF was also angered by continuing
violations of the ceasefire by the Armed Forces, which continued
operations in some areas, and the refusal of the government to react
to the NDF's complaints about this, while on the other hand the
national committee, which had been established to monitor the
ceasefire, had censured the NDF for doing no more than letting
some of its supporters appear in a parade carrying arms.
During this period, the BAYAN forces conducted a range of
activities to support the idea of a political settlement that would
address fundamental social and political problems, such as the need
for land reform. These activities were overshadowed, however, by
the extremely successful campaign waged by the NDF leaders. It
was a period of expanding popularity for the National Democratic
movement. The decision of the NDF to withdraw from the
negotiations was supported by the BAYAN forces.
The coalition for peace
From within the mass movement there emerged another
interpretation of the political implications of the ceasefire
negotiations. This interpretation came from the leading
organizations of the People's OUTCRY coalition, in particular,
BISIG. BISIG's view was that the achievement of a lasting
ceasefire was a popular demand, being articulated in particular by
the unorganized pro-Cory masses and reflected in Aquino's
continuing popularity. On 17 January BISIG issued a manifesto
(later published in Kasarinlan, Vol. 2,. No. 4 1987) entitled: 'An
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Alternative Approach to the Peace Negotiations: A Letter to Our
Friends in the NDF'. This manifesto opened:
Our people want peace. They want peace so urgently that
they demand an immediate moratorium on all conflicts
just to have political stability.
The claim was qualified by the expression of concerns, similar to
those of the NDF, about the root causes of popular unrest and
rebellion. The opening paragraph continued:
Yet it is clear that what our people need is hot just any
kind of peace, but a peace that will endure because it is
based on justice and reason.
The BISIG manifesto went on to outline how it saw the Aquino
government's strategy on the question:
The Aquino Government fervently believes that the cause
of a just, honorable and lasting peace could be achieved if
only it is given a chance to reconstruct a democratic
republic which would represent all classes equally, and
accommodate contending visions of social progress within
the framework of national reconciliation and political
pluralism.
On this premise, its peace proposals boil down to a
challenge to the revolutionary Left to set aside its arms and
peacefully pursue its vision for Philippine society. Failure
to take up this challenge is, from the Aquino
Government's point of view, synonymous to being the
enemy of peace and democracy.
The BISIG manifesto was not arguing for acceptance of the
government's view. As with the People's OUTCRY argument in
favour of the 'critical yes' policy, BISIG argued that it was
necessary somehow to respond to what it perceived to be the broad
popular sentiment at the time:
... it is undeniable that the Aquino Government occupies a
high moral ground in the eyes of our people when it
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demands that it be given a chance to prove its sincerity,
and when it accordingly enjoins the revolutionary forces to
submit themselves to a peaceful process of settling
differences in the approach to social change.
If it is to seize the political initiative and regain moral
ascendancy over all other class forces in Philippines
society, the revolutionary movement must now recognise
that a sudden shift in the political situation has indeed
occurred with the replacement of the fascist Marcos regime
by a popularly-installed liberal democratic government.
In the BISIG analysis, the central political issue was what it saw as
the popular demand for peace. BISIG was concerned that the
NDF's response might discredit the NDF in the eyes of Aquino's
mass following. A tactical difference was therefore emerging
between BISIG and the NDF. This manifesto, launched in mid-
January, was obviously aimed at convincing the NDF to try and
extend the ceasefire.
BISIG, however, did not call for the NDF to lay down its
arms. In suggesting the policy that the NDF might adopt on the
ceasefire, it proposed that the NDF agree to a ceasefire providing
that the government guarantee the NDF's right and ability to
participate freely in legal politics. BISIG also maintained that the
NDF should not lay down its arms until the private armies and
paramilitary groups were disbanded and the AFP reformed - as
Aquino had promised before the elections.
There is little doubt that the BISIG leadership's view was that
the government would not be able to fulfil its promises. Clearly
underlying its strategy was the idea that it was better that, if the
ceasefire talks were to fail, they fail because of the government's
inability to live up to its own ideals rather than because of its failure
to meet the NDF's demands, no matter how much those demands
were in the people's interests.
In this, there was also an unstated difference of analysis
between BISIG and the Natdems as to what the people expected
from Aquino on the question of peace. BISIG judged that the
people wanted peace, providing there was a possibility for
contending parties to compete peacefully. The NDF's position was
that the people wanted peace only on the condition that the socio
economic root causes of the people's problems were addressed
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directly. For BISIG, the NDF withdrawal from the ceasefire talks
before Aquino had been exposed as being unable to guarantee the
NDF's participation in legal politics free of harassment , and before
any reformation of the military, was a mistake. The NDF's view
was that the government had already been exposed to the people as
being disinterested in attacking the basic causes of economic and
social problems, because it insisted that there be no negotiations
outside the framework of the constitution.
The controversy over the ceasefire talks brought into being a
new coalition of groups calling for a resumption of the ceasefire
talks. This coalition, founded in January 1987 and called the
Coalition for Peace, included BISIG, VPD, the UP chapter of
KAAKBAY, Pandayan, the Socdem KASAPI group, and the
moderate Socdem groups BANDILA, PDSP, and FSDM.
The Coalition for Peace positioned itself outside the process
of dialogue between the NDF and the government and issued
demands upon them both. It is clear from its demands upon the
government that the Coalition shared concerns with the NDF. One
of its first statements followed in the wake of the 22 January
massacre outside the presidential palace. After condemning the
shooting of the peasants, it called on the government to take the
following steps to ensure that the peace dialogue continued:
Remove from active service command the most notorious
human rights violators (e.g. Abadilla in Bicol, Aguinaldo
and Figueroa in Region 2);12
Act on the PCHR recommendations regarding the repeal
of repressive decrees, the disbanding of private armies
and the deactivation of abusive CHDF [Civilian Home
Defence Force] units;
Punish the coup plotters and those responsible for the
murders of Olalia and Alay-ay;
12 These three were all to later support the 28 August 1987 attempted coup
by Colonel Gregorio Honasan.
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Conduct a swift investigation of the violence at Mendiola
last January 22, punish the perpetrators, and indemnify
the victims;
Take concrete steps towards agrarian reform (e.g.
Hacienda Lusita [the Aquino family property], idle lands
and confiscated crony lands as test cases);
Reassert civilian supremacy and instill discipline in the
armed forces. Rely once more on people power rather
than the military (A Call from the Coalition for Peace, 26
January 1987, reprinted in Coalition for Peace 1987:1-2).
The same statement went on to make certain demands on the
NDF as well. It called on the NDF to desist from confrontational
excesses; to avoid undertaking mass actions 'which might only
heighten the cycle of violence'; to support the progressive elements
in the government; to respect the right of the people to vote on the
constitution and to respect the result; and to encourage meaningful
local regional participation in negotiations by the NDF regional
forces.
After the breakdown of the ceasefire talks, the Coalition for
Peace called upon both sides to resume the dialogue. In particular,
it called for direct dialogue between President Aquino and the NDF
leadership. At the same time, it reiterated the demand on the
government to carry out reforms. In July 1987, on the eve of the
first sitting of the new Congress, it called on Congress to institute
agrarian reform and labour policy reform, to institutionalize a more
meaningful role for the 'parliament-of-the-streets', to reform the
military, and to bring the government and the NDF into dialogue
again (Coalition for Peace 1987:17-18).
The Coalition was unable, however, to conduct an effective
campaign on these issues. BISIG, VPD and Pandayan were small
and without the forces to launch an effective public campaign,
although it seems certain that they dominated the policy formulation
in the Coalition. The mainstream Socdem groups, such as
BANDILA, which had greater access to the media and government
and which could have helped get such a campaign off the ground,
did not do so. One of the key Socdem leaders, Teofisto Guingona,
was the head of the Government Negotiating Panel which had
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issued the statements about the 'new military man'. Guingona and
Butz Aquino were now part of officialdom.
There were, moreover, real ideological differences between
the supporters of the mainstream Socdems and the left wing. These
were glaringly exposed in the aftermath of the August 28 coup
attempt. A week after the coup attempt the Coalition held an
emergency conference to discuss reaction to the coup, and when a
vote was taken on a statement condemning both the coup plotters
and the NPA, only BISIG and VPD voted against it. The left wing
argued that the popular rebellion had been forced upon the
peasantry and other oppressed sectors because no other way was
left open to them given the repression of the Marcos dictatorship.
The instruments of that dictatorship, the AFP and the paramilitary
forces, had been neither purged nor reformed under Aquino; in their
view, the popular rebellion could not be put in the same category as
the Honasan coup.
It seems fairly certain that while the mainstream Socdem
groups were signatory to the early Coalition for Peace manifestos,
the group remained essentially in the hands of the BISIG-VPD-
Pandayan alliance, with the support of individuals with a similar
outlook, such as Dr Nemesio Prudente and Dr Ed Garcia. Prudente
had been a member of a small underground anti-Marcos group until
his capture in 1985. Garcia was a leading figure from KAAKBAY.
In that sense, the Coalition for Peace was a continuation of the
People's OUTCRY initiative, which the key OUTCRY groups had
been able to broaden to include the more moderate and right-wing
Socdem forces. On the other hand, the Natdem groups which
supported OUTCRY did not, with the exception of VPD, join
Coalition for Peace.
The congressional elections
As discussed above, the Natdem forces had been able to launch,
with a great deal of publicity, their new party, the Partido ng Bayan
(PnB). The PnB decided to field candidates for both the Senate and
the House of Representatives. Of all the 'parliament-of-the-streets'
organizations, the Natdem forces were the only group able to
launch an independent national election campaign. Together with
VPD and BAYAN, the PnB campaigned as the Alliance for New
Politics (ANP).
The Movement During the Interregnum from Revolution 55
The smaller Left forces, BISIG and Pandayan, supported
candidates that were standing for other parties whom they
considered to be progressive. These included PnB. Pandayan also
fielded a candidate in one House of Representatives seat and one
Pandayan member, Florencio Abad, stood for the Liberal Party
(and was elected).
The Alliance for New Politics
There was a number of important features of the ANP campaign.
They included the organizational strength and significant mass base
of the Natdems, the quality of the Natdem leadership, and the
PnB's monopoly, amongst the electoral parties, of issue-oriented
(as distinct from personality-oriented) politics. The campaign,
however, also revealed the Natdems' weakness in popular
mobilization.
The ANP was able to mount a national campaign for the
Senate. It fielded seven candidates: Bernabe 'Dante' Buscayno
(former head of the NPA), Horacio 'Boy' Morales (former
chairman of the NDF), Crispin Beltran (chairman of the KMU),
Jaime Tadeo (chairman of the KMP), Nelia Sancho (secretary-
general of GABRIELA), Romeo Capulong (lawyer for the NDF)
and Jose Burgos Jr. (former editor of the anti-Marcos paper We
Forum and editor of Malaya).1^ By any account, this was a
formidable team. The fact that the ANP could bring together the
country's most famous guerilla fighter (Dante), its most famous
renegade technocrat (Morales), the heads of the largest worker,
peasant and women's organizations, and one of the country's most
outstanding journalists indicates the underlying strength of the
National Democratic movement.
Unlike the landlord- and business-based parties (and
remembering that Aquino herself has one of the largest
landholdings in the country), the ANP had virtually no access to
major sources of funds. (When the successful senators declared
their pecuniary interests in August, it was revealed that only one of
13 Profiles of each of the ANP candidates are contained in 'The Magnificent
Seven', Midweek 1 April 1987.
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the 24 senators was not a peso millionaire.) Even so, the ANP was
able to take its senatorial team to most parts of the country and to
organize rallies and parades in many provincial cities. It relied on
its mass base in the provinces to provide the logistics. Transport
between major cities on the larger islands was by bus, and often
accommodation could only be organized at the last minute as the
campaign teams arrived at the next stop.
In addition to its seven-candidate senatorial team (interview
with campaign organizer for Horacio Morales, August 1987), the
ANP put up a number of candidates for House of Representative
seats. This was the most dangerous area of activity for ANP
campaigners: over forty PnB campaign workers were killed and
many were harassed during the campaign. Even in Manila, in the
electoral district where BAYAN secretary-general Lean Alejandro
stood campaign workers were harassed and some detained.
The ANP was the only party to campaign around issues. Its
campaign emphasized such things as the need for land reform,
industrialization based on greater control of foreign investors, the
removal of the US bases, changes in the labour laws, a new foreign
debt policy, and improvement of conditions for women. Detailed
policy proposals were formulated.14 This was in marked contrast
with the government's campaign, which became known as 'armpit
polities'. The essence of the campaign for the pro-government
Senate candidates was to project them as being supported by
Aquino; pictures of candidates standing with Aquino, hands held
high together (thus the reference to armpits), were the major aspect
of the publicity campaign, along with Aquino's personal
appearances in support of these candidates. The government
campaign gave virtually no attention to policies and issues,
relegating this to discussion in the Congress once it was elected.
The underlying appeal of the campaign was the assertion that a
landslide win for Aquino's team would finally consolidate the
government and end the transition from 'provisional government' to
tenured government. Like the overwhelming positive vote for the
constitution, the eventual overwhelming vote for Aquino's Senate
*4 A compendium of material used by ANP candidates can be found in
Briefing Papers on Selected National Issues prepared by the Nationalist
Alliance.
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team was, in reality, a vote to ensure the end of the Marcos
dictatorship, and to secure all the good things that might flow from
the new dispensation.
The ANP's vote disappointed many on the Left. No ANP
candidates were elected as senators, and only two House of
Representatives candidates were elected. The most popular ANP
candidates, Dante and Morales, secured just over two million votes.
The campaign for social and political reform, addressing the root
causes of the country's social and economic problems, came up
against a strong popular belief that securing the Aquino government
would bring an end to uncertainty and make impossible a return to
dictatorship. The so-called 'Cory factor' was less significant in the
House of Representatives elections, where many Aquino-backed
candidates were defeated by opponents with strong landlord and
military backing. The Senate, on the other hand, was projected as a
wing of the government itself. Aquino arguied that her team
should dominate the Senate so as to ensure efficient government; as
she herself put it, the Senate should be 'without opposition'.
At the local level, the ANP came up against cheating and
harassment. On the island of Negros, for example, there was a
number of districts in which the PnB received no votes, although
several people whom the author interviewed insisted they had
indeed voted for PnB. Other observers reported similarly. Vote
buying was also a problem for the PnB. Its potential supporters
were to be found amongst the most impoverished sectors of the
population, who often find it difficult to refuse offers of financial
gifts during the lead-up to the elections. This is complicated when
die offer comes from landlords and refusal brings the threat of
reprisals. On Negros, official PnB policy was that people should
take the money but vote with their conscience; the problem was that
having received gifts, people's consciences told them to vote for the
landlord's candidate (interviews with members of the Negros
executive of PnB).
The ANP therefore faced two basic problems. First, it
projected itself as a radical alternative to the Aquino government
when the belief of big sections of the unorganized masses and the
middle class was that the only alternative to Aquino in the short
term was a return to dictatorship. It was enough for the
government team to call for 'a vote for Cory', because Cory was
still equated with stability. Secondly, it faced the repressive
presence of landlords and the military throughout the countryside.
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activities that might promote illusions that real social change could
be brought about through elections. The dominance of the
landlord-military complex would ensure a landlord-millionaire-
controlled Congress. There was a strong tendency, therefore, to
use the campaign as an arena for raising issues and doing
educational work. The necessary arrangements for mobilizing
voters on voting day and arranging scrutineers to check for cheating
during the vote count were often not carried out. This made the
ANP more vulnerable to the tricks employed by the opposition.
Also, the ANP used very stringent criteria in deciding whether to
collaborate with non-ANP candidates. Non-ANP candidates whom
the ANP supported were sometimes expected to support all of the
ANP platform and election strategy. In some cases the ANP put up
candidates against popular local progressive figures, or withdrew
from alliances with such people, consequently reducing the ANP
vote.
At the second national council meeting of the PnB, in August
1987, a lively debate took place on these questions. The meeting,
attended by over one hundred delegates from around the country -
provincial and national, worker, peasant and middle-class -
discussed the problems of the party and the things needed to be
done for the forthcoming local elections, and resolved to look more
closely at the relationship between education and winning elections.
The PnB had not succeeded in mobilizing far beyond its
organized base (and had let some of its votes be stolen away) but it
had strengthened its credentials, learnt from its experiences, and
renewed its commitment. It is likely, however, that with increased
activity by right-wing vigilantes and military 'counter-insurgents' in
the aftermath of the Honasan coup attempt, PnB candidates in the
next elections will be taking their lives in their hands. Aquino's
shift to the right, her greater reliance on the military, public
association with the vigilantes, and the crackdown on labour
unions, may also have reduced enthusiasm for participation in
future elections.
The Movement for New Politics
The ANP campaign was not the only electoral initiative to emerge
from within the mass movement. BISIG, Ed De la Torre's Institute
for Popular Democracy, and various left Socdem personalities
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attempted to establish a campaign formation called the Movement
for New Politics (MNP). Like LAKAS, the MNP's underlying
purpose was to build the broadest possible left-to-centre coalition.
The basic idea behind the MNP was to campaign for all candidates,
regardless of party, who agreed to support MNP's legislative
agenda. MNP hoped to attract non-party mass organizations which
could be mobilized in support of such candidates.15 It also seems
that many in the MNP thought that the PnB/ANP's popular appeal
was too narrowly based to gather the maximum momentum for
progressive policies such as land reform and opposition to the US
bases. They thought that the PnB was too closely associated with
both the 1986 boycott campaign and the CPP. By building a
broader coalition, still united by certain basic policies, they
considered greater momentum could be developed.
The MNP, however, faced problems similar to those
experienced by LAKAS and People's OUTCRY; it simply did not
have sufficient forces to wage an effective campaign. Only BISIG
was sufficiently well-organized to do any campaigning and it was
still very small. Further, the MNP was overshadowed by those
groups actually running candidates and the situation was
complicated by the fact that the PnB-BAYAN-VPD alliance also
used the term 'new politics' in forming the Alliance for New
Politics.
The MNP was most effective in assisting the campaigns of
particular candidates, notably that of Nikki Coseteng who stood for
a new party, KAIBA Party, established on the initiative of figures
within GABREELA to represent women's interests. Coseteng was
a wealthy businesswoman who had been active in the mass
movement and could be counted amongst the militant nationalist
wing of the Libdems. She was a popular and glamorous figure,
renowned not only for her militancy within the 'parliament-of-the-
streets' but also as a former manager of one of the Philippines most
popular basketball teams. Coseteng supported many of the same
policies as the ANP and, having been elected, is now chairperson
of the House of Representatives Human Rights Committee
investigating the abuses of vigilante groups. Coseteng was the only
MNP-supported candidate to win and overall the MNP's impact on
" See the MNP manifesto, Movement for New Politics (roneod) and its
People's Legislative Agenda, issued as campaign leaflets.
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the election was slight (interviews with BISIG activists, August
1987, and with Coseteng, September 1987).
Chapter 3
After Legitimacy: The Mass Movement of the
Offensive, May-August 1987
During the period between January 1986 and May 1987, the mass
movement was essentially preoccupied with responding to the new
government's initiatives, which included the constitutional
plebiscite, ceasefire talks and congressional elections. Yet the
movement also continued the grassroots organizing work being
done in sectoral organizations, such as the trade unions.
At a superficial level, the appearance was that Aquino had
succeeded. She could claim that both the constitutional plebiscite
and the congressional elections had reinforced her mandate to
govern. The character of that mandate, however, was ambiguous.
While there was very little debate over the contents of the
constitution during the plebiscite and very httle debate over policies
during the congressional elections, it cannot be assumed that the
mass of people who voted for Aquino had no policy expectations,
even though it might be difficult to identify precisely what those
expectations were.
The mass movement organizations claimed that the people
had given Aquino a mandate to implement a whole range of
reforms which had been long demanded by the mass movement
during the period of opposition to Marcos. The popular decision to
stabilize Aquino's rule was based, they argued, on the assumption
that this stability was to enable her government to push through
with reforms. Following the massive 'yes' vote at the
constitutional plebiscite, which many in the mass movement
considered was ample reaffirmation of the mandate given to
Aquino in February, Randy David, deputy chairman of BISIG,
asked the following questions in a Kasarinlan editorial:
Will she use these [her near absolute powers] to correct
the basic structural injustices that have accumulated ...?
Will she, in particular, address the urgent problem of
peasant landlessness now, or will she defer to Congress?
Will she ...overhaul the political system and bureaucracy
which were elaborately defined by her fascist
predecessor? When will the promised streamlining of the
bureaucracy begin? How soon can we expect the much
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delayed reorganization and cleansing of the military?
Will she use her enormous popularity to rally her
depoliticized people behind the ideals of national
sovereignty, social justice, and popular democracy?
(David 1987:4).
If David was asking these questions in relation to what might
happen immediately after the big 'yes' vote in the constitutional
plebiscite, the answer to all the questions was in the event, 'no'.
With a third mandate, following the congressional elections,
expectations rose again. At the very least, it could be assumed that
things would get better, that there would be signs that reforms
were beginning to take place.
A situation involving the sharpest of contradictions had been
brought into existence. The constitutional and electoral exercises
were intended to legitimize and stabilize. Having appeared to do
so, the arguments for postponing reforms had been removed. The
mass movement could be expected to become more united and
aggressive in insisting on reforms. A more united and aggressive
mass movement, however, would undermine the government's
attempts to attain stability and legitimacy. Restoring a
parliamentary form of politics would also reduce the role of the
mass movement. If legitimacy was to come from a voted mandate,
stability was to come from ending mobilizational politics, or, more
precisely, demobilizing the mass movement and isolating the Left.
Associated with this, the failure of attempts to bring about a
permanent ceasefire - a failure for which the NDF was held
responsible - was seen as a means of further isolating the
underground Left.
The attempt to demobilize the masses was partially
successful, in that BANDILA and the Coryistas ceased to be
active. However, the national democratic forces remained cohesive
and grew steadily and the militant wing of the Socdems and
Libdems had a new source of leadership to which they could look,
in the form of BISIG and the VPD.
Ideological confrontation
In some senses, the mass movement, in particular the National
Democrats, had already gone on the offensive. This was partly the
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result of posing the Partido ng Bayan as a direct alternative to the
Aquino regime, but a more important development was Aquino's
response to the breakdown of the ceasefire talks in calling for 'total
war' against the insurgency. This decision must be seen as the
first clear break by Aquino with the rhetoric of ending the
insurgency by addressing its socio-economic causes. The policy
had direct consequences for the legal movement as well as the
underground. To the extent that her speech signalled presidential
support for increased counter-insurgency campaigns by the
military, it was also seen to condone intensified harassment of legal
grassroots organizers in the countryside and amongst the urban
poor.
There were no major NPA-AFP battles following the call for
'total war'. In a guerilla war there can be no big battles unless the
guerrillas want to do battle. Intensified counter-insurgency activity
meant more forced shifting of villages (hamletting), more zoning
operations (house-to-house searches by the military), and more
interrogations of suspected NPA supporters. In addition, the 'total
war' concept was an implicit legitimation of the use of right-wing
vigilantes, many of whom, though referred to under different
names, already had a record of gruesome abuses under Marcos.
New vigilante groups, armed and financed by the military,
emerged and started assisting the military in hamletting, zoning,
and interrogating. Many grassroots activists and organizers were
killed.i
The ideological offensive against the government was
focused on this 'total war' policy, which was seen as part of a US-
sponsored Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) strategy. In the absence
of opportunity for a return to the Marcos-style dictatorial rule, the
US was pushing, said the critics, for a policy of offering
parliamentary rule with one hand and whipping up intensified
military repression at the grassroots with the other. As the
activities of the vigilantes increased, and the campaigns of the
military in the countryside escalated, causing more and more
refugees to flee to major provincial cities or to Manila, the
For a survey of vigilante groups see Human Rights Update, May-June
1987, and former US Attorney-General Ramsey Clarke's report on human
rights under Aquino reprinted in Human Rights Update, June-July 1987.
Human Rights Update is a publication by the Association of Major
Religious Superiors of the Philippines.
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propaganda attacks on LIC and 'total war' increased (see Racaza
1987; Rao 1987; Coronel in Manila Chronicle 26 March 1987).
This trend was reinforced as the military was used more
frequently against labour picket lines in the city, and zoning was
extended to the slum suburbs of Manila. In the period January-
August 1987, the Association of Major Religious Superiors alleged
that there were 2648 political arrests and 406 were still in gaol.
They also reported 434 cases of torture, 30 disappearances and 135
political killings. They also claimed that 95 people had been killed
and 122 wounded in military massacres of civilian populations and
that 13,794 families had been forced to evacuate areas because of
military operations, and that food blockades had been set up in
seventeen barangays. {Human Rights Update September 1987).
BAYAN and the various sectoral organizations increasingly
challenged the government on these issues. Activists and
supporters of the National Democratic movement saw less and less
difference between the Aquino government and the Marcos
government. BAYAN and PnB in fact changed their policy from
one of 'vigilant and principled support', adopted immediately after
the February Revolution, to one of 'principled opposition'.
The National Democratic underground, the NDF, held to a
similar position but took the analysis further by calling the
government the 'US-Aquino regime'. This had a similar ring to
'US-Marcos dictatorship', which was the National Democratic
movement's term for the old regime, but a distinction was drawn
between a dictatorship and an authoritarian regime. Following the
breakdown of the ceasefire talks, the NPA also resumed normal
operations, including ambushes and assassinations by urban
partisans, notably Manila's Alex Boncayo Brigade.
Overall, however, despite the often sharp Natdem language,
the ideological offensive was subdued. Even during the PnB
election campaign, the tendency was to concentrate more on issues
than on the general character of the regime. Neither BAYAN nor
its affiliates launched any significant offensive mass actions, with
the exception of the January 1987 peasant protest which ended in
the Mendiola massacre.
BISIG and the other smaller left-wing groups retained their
basic 'critical support' approach but with increasing criticism as
time progressed. BISIG strongly attacked the government over the
massacre of protesting peasants in January and joined the protest
rally that was held following the massacre. It also attacked the
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government for encouraging the spread of the vigilantes and it
issued highly critical statements attacking the government's
privatization campaign and other economic policies. BISIG's
general orientation to the government was based on two premises.
First, it considered that the Aquino government was still under
threat of a military coup that would unleash an even more total
'total war'. Its critical support policy, therefore, took the form of
attacking the rightist opponents of the Aquino government rather
than of praising Aquino's policies. It was prepared, also, to call
on the people to defend the government should it come under attack
from the military (BISIG 1987:36-37). Secondly, BISIG believed
that the majority of the unorganized masses, who were still
sympathetic to the idea of social and political reform, would not
listen - at this stage - to political organizations which proposed the
overthrow of Aquino. Aquino was still popular, BISIG believed,
and was seen by the unorganized masses as a bulwark against the
return of dictatorship.
The differences or orientation to the government between the
BAYAN forces and the smaller left forces based on the Coalition
for Peace remained a major stumbling block to the formation of any
strategic alliance. Indeed from January to July 1987 relations
between the two left currents may have been at their worst. This
period also saw some dissent within Natdem forces become public,
as for example when Dante Buscayno called for a halt to the urban
guerilla operations and a toning down of attacks on Aquino herself.
Criticisms even began to emerge of the notion of 'popular
democracy', insofar as it was seen to imply an alliance with former
anti-Marcos mass movement groups whose members now held
government positions.
Open debates started to take place on such questions as
extending the ceasefire talks, and on whether or not there was a
threat of a coup and what its implications might be. The Natdems
thought that BISIG and its friends were becoming timid just when
Aquino was starting her 'total war' strategy. BISIG and its friends
thought that the Natdems were endangering the movement as a
whole by isolating it from what BISIG viewed as the massive pro-
Cory sentiment of the masses while there was still an impending
threat of a 'neofascist' revival.
However, despite this tension common opposition to specific
government policies enabled the mass movement to go on the
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offensive. It did so in two main arenas: the Congress and, under
National Democratic leadership, the 'parliament-of-the-streets'.
The offensive in Congress
The congressional elections delivered a victory to Aquino, to big
business and to the 'landlord-military complex'. According to
research done by the Institute of Popular Democracy (IPD 1987),
over half the new members of the House of Representatives
belonged, or used to belong, to the traditional political parties
which had historically supported or at least accepted Marcos rule.
The IPD research firmly indicated that the landlords and big
business based political clans had reasserted themselves strongly in
the provincial cities and in the countryside. The power of the
landlord-military complex in the provinces, in areas devoid of
media observation, cannot be over-emphasized.
In the Senate, Aquino herself fielded an official ticket and
won all but two of the seats. The ticket was a coalition of leaders
of major political clans, big business and lawyers who had been
prominent in the anti-Marcos opposition or who had crossed sides
soon afterwards. It, too, was dominated by the wealthy. This was
a victory for the Aquino forces. Many commentators amongst the
mass movement immediately began to express serious reservations
about the potential of the new congress (Manglogon 1987; IPD
1987), reservations which are turning out to be well-founded.
However, in terms of propaganda advances, the mass movement
made big gains during the first two months of the Congress.
The mass movement had some representatives and
sympathizers in Congress. In the House of Representatives, there
were two PnB members, Representative Garduce from Samar, and
Representative Andalona from Leyte. In addition, Abad, from
Pandayan won a seat as a Liberal Party candidate and Nikki
Coseteng, who stood for the women's party, KAIBA, won her
seat. The former exile Bonifacio Gillego, who stood successfully
as a Christian Democrat, was a strong supporter of land reform and
democratic rights. Altogether there are probably between six and
twenty House of Representative members who take strong stands
on nationalist and democratic issues, including land reform. These
members are organized into two caucuses, as well as the majority
caucus to which they all, including the PnB members, belong. The
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larger, looser caucus is called the Solidarity Caucus. The initiative
for its establishment seems to have come from Coseteng. The
smaller and more radical group at the centre of the radical initiatives
in the House is the Nationalist Bloc. Its membership comprises the
two PnB members, the representative from the Cordillera region,
William Claver, Gillego and, more recently, Abad.
In the Senate, the pro-mass-movement 'bloc' is represented
by Wigberto Tanada, son of Lorenzo Tafiada of BAYAN. The
other mass movement figure on the Aquino slate, Bobbit Sanchez,
under controversial circumstances failed to secure election.2
During his period as labour minister he had won the support of
organizations such as the KMU. However, the pro-Aquino
sentiment in the Senate impeded the emergence of a left-wing,
progressive or mass movement dissident bloc. There were
exceptions on some issues: on the issue of the US military bases,
for example, a number of senators indicated their opposition to the
bases or at least called for implementation of anti-nuclear policies
but they were not particularly active in campaigning or spreading
propaganda.
The land reform campaign
The best example of the gains made by the mass movement in the
battle of ideas within Congress was in the area of land reform. The
demand for comprehensive land reform had been at the forefront of
the mass movement's program during the struggle against Marcos.
Landlessness and rural exploitation were the most widely
recognized root causes of the armed rebellion. Land was given the
highest priority in Aquino's promised program of reforms. It was
also a fundamental plank in the policies of the NDF, which
believed that a radical reworking of land ownership was essential
for the establishment of a democratic system. Without the
liberation of the peasantry from the landlords, liberal democracy
could not deliver even its own limited agenda.
Based on interviews with Garduce (PNB), Abad (Pandayan/Liberal
Party),Coseteng (KAIBA/independent), September 1987.
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Because of the primacy of this demand, there were many calls
on Aquino to use her special powers under the 'Freedom
Constitution' to introduce by decree a radical and comprehensive
land reform law before Congress met. Given that Congress was
dominated by millionaire landlords, there was considerable
scepticism that this would eventuate. The government had, in fact,
moved very early to formulate a land reform policy. In March
1986 a special task force was established to formulate land reform
proposals. The task force included Ed Tadem, a University of the
Philippines academic and member of BISIG, as well as a recently
released political detainee. It formulated a radical and
comprehensive policy which was submitted to the Ministry of
Agriculture. Some were inspired by Aquino's appointment of
these radicals to hope for reform.
Between April 1986 and July 1987, however, there was
steady and accelerating compromise on all the basic components of
land reform policy. The final compromise took place when, just
days before Congress was to sit, Aquino issued her decree on the
so-called Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
CARP was not only disappointing in its vagueness but also in its
confrontational attitude towards the peasant movement. It left
Congress to decide how much land a landlord could keep, how
much he would be paid, what land should be distributed first and at
what pace, how the peasant should pay for his land and how
much. In other words, Aquino had, in reality, simply handed land
reform to the landlord-dominated Congress. On the other hand,
she put into her own decree the provision that all peasants who
illegally occupied land prior to the reforms being passed by
Congress would be denied the right to receive land.3 Additionally,
of course, they could be arrested. Many in the mass movement
saw the contrast between the vagueness of the redistribution
principles and the harshness of the anti-peasant provisions as
symbolic of a basic lack of commitment to land reform. It was also
another stark repudiation of mobilizational politics.
As soon as Congress met, a campaign was started to promote
land reform. The Nationalist Bloc introduced a draft bill that set a
two hectare retention limit (Malaya 1 August 1987; Manila
Chronicle 4 August 1987). It sought confiscation of the large
For a comprehensive analysis of the CARP see Rodriguez (1987).
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tracts of land owned by big landlords and called for agribusiness-
owned lands to be included in the land reform program. It
provided no compensation to the big landlords who had already
profited from the land for decades, although smaller and medium
landlords would receive some compensation. The principal
sponsor of the bill, Butsch Abad, explained that the redistribution
of land should not simply be a real estate transaction, whereby the
peasantry was forced to buy back the land at market values despite
the fact that they had been exploited by the landlords for decades
(interview with Florencio Abad, September 1987).
Being the only document already drafted, the nationalist bloc
bill was taken by the Congressional Agrarian Reform Committee as
the basic document for discussion. From the beginning, the
committee chairman, Gillego, was sceptical as to its fate. Although
he was supportive of the bill, his committee was dominated by
landlords.
In the event, the pro-land reform group on the committee was
able to out-manoeuvre the majority. The bill which the committee
finally submitted to the House, although having increased the
retention limit to seven hectares, remained a strong bill, retaining,
for example, the provision of no compensation for big landlords.
The committee's acceptance of this bill (House Bill 400), however,
was qualified to the extent that many members reserved the right to
oppose it on the floor of the house.
What was significant in this was the ability of the Nationalist
Bloc to retain the initiative, despite its minority position. In that
sense, the return to traditional party politics was not effective in
isolating representatives of the mass movement. The mass
movement also supported the Nationalist Bloc outside parliament.
The KMP continued its series of protests, demonstrations and
pickets outside government offices. The movement also intervened
directly in the political conflict occurring in parliament through a
new alliance formed across Natdem-Socdem-Libdem lines around
the land reform question.
This alliance, formed in May 1987, was called the Congress
for Peoples Agrarian Reform (CPAR). CPAR comprised thirteen
peasant and fishermen's organizations claiming a total membership
of 1.5 million people. The major organizations included Socdem-
oriented organizations, independent groups, the Natdem KMP, and
the radical and well-organized National Federation of Sugar
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Workers (NFSW)4. BISIG people were also involved; Tadem,
for example, had been active in drafting CPAR policy documents.
Leading organizers, such as Isagani Serrano from Volunteers for
Popular Democracy, joined the alliance. CPAR's main activities
were directed towards developments inside Congress. It set up a
tent city outside Congress where it could lobby members and
profile the issue for the public. CPAR also appeared before
congressional hearings, representing a peasant perspective on land
reform. It issued press statements and circulated documents
commenting on new proposals and ideas as they emerged in
Congress. In particular, CPAR lobbied strongly for the discussion
and adoption of House Bill 400.
Again, the level of protest and propaganda activity and, more
importantly, the formation of a cross-ideological peasant class
alliance indicates the extent to which the mass movement was able
to take the initiative. While the machinations of the landlord
majority ensured a postponement of any vote on the bill, they were
unable to prevent the organizational and propaganda initiatives of
the mass movement. The high profile of the parliamentary debates,
combined with the mobilizing activities of organizations like the
KMP and NFSW in the provinces - as, for example, in the
occupation of abandoned land - showed that by correctly grasping
the appropriate issue it was possible for the mass movement to
begin to unify and strengthen itself again.
See CPAR documents: Congress for People's Agrarian Reform
(typescript); CPAR Declaration of Principles (roneod), also published in
Kasarinlan 2nd Quarter 1987 and in The Workers Voice 10 June 1987
under the title 'Salient Points of People Programme for Agrarian
Reform'; 'Workers Call for Land Reform', The Workers Voice
(publication of the NFSW), 10 July 1987. Data was also obtained from
an interview with Edgar Estacio, vice- president
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The August welgang bayan
The possibility of further, effective mass action was demonstrated
in a series of strikes and protests between 17 and 27 August.
Again, the key to the movement's success was the correct choice of
issue: an increase in the prices of oil, petrol, and kerosene. The
protests climaxed in a very successful 'peoples strike', the welgang
bayan.
In August 1987 the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB)
announced price increases ranging from 17 per cent to 22 per cent
for petrol, diesel and kerosene. There were also 7 per cent to 10
per cent increases in the price of gas. The price of fuel has a strong
influence on the cost of living, especially for the poor who use
kerosene for cooking and boiling water, and are particularly
affected by increases in bus and jeepney fares. It has always been
a politically sensitive issue in the Philippines.
The unpopularity of its decision was exacerbated by the way
in which it was taken; Aquino, declaring that 'the increase was
long overdue', approved the price rises, following submissions to
the ERB from Royal Dutch Shell, Caltex and Petron, despite the
fact that the ERB was, in accordance with its own procedures, still
to receive submissions from opponents of price rise.
In Congress, the decision was attacked from left, centre and
right. Even the conservative Trade Union Congress of the
Philippines (TUCP), formerly supportive of Marcos, threatened to
organize a jeepney driver strike. The press universally condemned
the decision.
Earlier, the more independent-minded trade unions had
formed a coalition through the Labour Advisory and Consultative
Council (LACC) established by the former Minister for Labour,
Bobbit Sanchez. It comprised the KMU, the Filipino affiliates to
the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the church-
influenced, Socdem-oriented Federation of Free Workers, and the
Lakas Manggagawa (Workers' Power) coalition, which includes
BISIG and Pandayan-influenced unions as well as various other
independent, progressive unions. The LACC also indicated its
opposition to the oil price rise and said that it would be appealing to
the Supreme Court. The LACC's approach was a moderate one,
calling for sobriety in the union response. This caution no doubt
reflected the Socdem presence in the coalition. The KMU, the
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WFTU affiliates and the left-wing of Lakas Manggagawa agreed to
LACC's moderate approach for the sake of unity. The effect of the
unified LACC protest and appeal to the Courts was to add weight
to the opposition to the price rise.
Meanwhile, other sections of the mass movement, essentially
under the leadership of the Natdem forces, were preparing a more
militant response. BAYAN, KMU and a number of smaller
organizations came together to form the Coalition Against Oil Price
Rises (COAP). COAP planned a series of protests for Monday 17
August. Central to this action were transport stoppages by the
more militant jeepney driver associations, which were either
directly affiliated to KMU or operated in alliances in which KMU
jeepney driver associations played a leading role.
On August 17, public transport in Manila came to a virtual
stop. The government was forced to use dump trucks to provide
transportation for the public. The following days saw mounting
criticism in Congress and from the press. Following the success
of the August 17 strike and in the context of continuing protest and
opposition, COAP announced plans for a week of protests between
21 August and 26 August, culminating in a national welgang bayan
on the 26th. This would be the first attempt at a peoples strike
during the nineteen months of Aquino's government. The mass
movement's sharpest weapon against Marcos, the Natdem' s
welgang bayan, was now to be used against Aquino herself.
The week of protest began with a 10,000-strong rally outside
the presidential palace, attended mostly by members of the KMU
and the Natdem urban poor groups. There were speakers from
most of the sectoral mass organizations affiliated to BAYAN.
Leaders of BAYAN and Partido ng Bayan also spoke. Effigies of
Aquino, as well as of the head of the ERB and Uncle Sam
(representing the oil companies) were burned. COAP re-iterated its
threat to organize a full-scale welgang bayan if the government did
not reverse the price rise.
Symposia and other activities held at BAYAN suburban
branches and smaller rallies and demonstrations took place in most
important provincial towns. Another strike by bus and jeepney
drivers again severely disrupted public transport and there was a
largely successful boycott of classes in many of Manila's
universities.
The breadth and depth of public anger was reflected in the
positive media coverage of the proposed welgang bayan.
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Commentators began talking about the revival of 'peoples power'.
It began to seem increasingly possible that a successful welgang
bayan could be pulled off. On Monday 24, the pressure on the
government rose when COAP leaders, including BAYAN
secretary-general Lean Alejandro and jeepney-driver leader
Medardo Rodawas, announced that the welgang bayan would go
ahead on the following Wednesday 26.
On Monday and Tuesday, BAYAN and its affiliates carried
out protest actions in a number of cities and towns. In Manila,
there were further strike actions by jeepney and bus drivers and in
Cebu City human roadblocks were dispersed by water cannons.
Police arrested forty protesters, including the chairperson of
BAYAN in Cebu, Professor Zenaida Uy. In Davao City, 90 per
cent of public utilities' vehicles were off the road, with 4000
drivers on strike. The Davao authorities put on 50 buses guarded
by armed soldiers and vigilantes. In Bicol, public transport was
paralyzed in Camarines Sur, Albay and Sorsogon. BAYAN also
held rallies in Bataan, Bulacan, and Pampanga.
On Tuesday night, Aquino appeared on TV to announce that
she was halving the price rise. Her move, however, was too late.
The COAP leaders announced that the strike would go ahead and
that they would continue to demand a full price rise reduction. In
many ways, what occurred on the following day was an even more
impressive welgang bayan than had occurred during Marcos's
time. Strikes, combined with pickets, rallies or parades, occurred
in most parts of the Philippines; there was no major provincial city
where a protest action did not take place.
The Manila transport system was brought to a halt, with the
city a virtual ghost-town. Hundreds of thousands of people stayed
home. Human barricades were set up throughout the city, and
clashes took place when police and army used water cannons and
truncheon attacks to disperse rallyists. Many people were injured.
The majority of school and university classes were cancelled.
Office workers, those who were able to get to work, were sent
home.
KMU, the WFTU affiliates and the Lakas Manggagawa
unions called on their members in certain industries to strike.
Walkouts occurred in big chemical and food factories such as
Procter and Gamble, Nestles and Pure Foods, and many smaller
establishments. (The Socdem-oriented Federation of Free Workers
did not participate.) The newly-formed civil servants association,
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the Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of
Government Employees (COURAGE) also led its members in a
walkout. Eight bank employee unions went on strike, as did
employees of the Shoemart department store chain and thirty-two
factories in the Bataan Export Processing Zone. Human
roadblocks were established in Bataan and Cavite, where one
striker was shot dead by police dispersing pickets. In Pampanga,
public transport was paralyzed. In Cebu, the huge Atlas mine was
paralyzed and walkouts were reported in at least eleven factories.
There were more rallies and thirty more protesters were arrested.
Classes in five universities were suspended. In Bacolod City, a
consumers' holiday was declared while the public transport system
came to a halt. In Davao, 3000 jeepneys and buses stopped.
Despite Aquino's popularity, the welgang bayan was an
enormous success for the National Democratic forces who showed
convincingly that they were the most serious and effective force in
the protests. There is little doubt that without the actions organized
by BAYAN and the threat of the welgang bayan there would have
been no change to the price rise. Congressional and press criticism
would not have had the same effect. The public, and the press,
were conscious of the importance of the welgang bayan. The day
before the strike most of the major dailies carried banner headlines
such as: 'Welgan On!', and 'welgang bayan Looms!'. Moreover,
the impending strike was projected positively in the press. This
was partially because of the popularity of the issue, but also a
result of BAYAN's care to ensure that it cooperated with other
groups wherever possible in other, more moderate, actions. The
KMU, for example, worked with the other LACC unions in
preparing to appeal the government's decision in the Supreme
Court.
The impact of the welgang bayan cannot be overemphasized.
It was a major shock to the government. The government had been
forced to partially reverse a decision, but found that even this
concession did not stop the actions. The fragile nature of Aquino's
popularity had been revealed. More importantly, the National
Democratic forces had shown in action that they were the most
effective defenders of the people's interests. Some observers
commented that the BAYAN rallies on the day were relatively
small. This was true. The rallies, strikes and pickets were carried
out by organized groups; there was little spontaneous involvement,
with the majority of people indicating their protest by staying at
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home. But the achievement of the National Democratic forces in
the welgang bayan was not their ability to mobilise the semi-
politicized masses in direct action but their success in mobilizing its
organized forces in an effective mass strike which gained sympathy
and respect. The challenge of winning leadership over the
unorganized masses still lay ahead. The Natdems were, however,
in a much better position to launch new initiatives.
Meanwhile, the government's position had been severely
weakened. Even the liberal wing of the establishment press ran
anti-government editorials in the aftermath of the strike. An
editorial in the Philippines Inquirer (27 August 1987) was
representative of the mood that the welgang bayan generated:
Strike vs Smug Gov't
The success of yesterday's Welga ng Bayan was
stunning not only because it crippled almost totally mass
transport in Metro Manila and other urban centres
throughout the country, but also because the several
steps the Aquino administration took to discourage the
protesters had failed so miserably.
The magnitude of popular indignation was so great that
not even Ms. Aquino's 1 1th hour attempts late Tuesday
afternoon to dampen the enthusiasm of the strikers by
announcing a 'partial rollback' of fuel prices was able to
halt the Welga proceeding as scheduled.
In the end, the Aquino adminstration had no other
recourse but to fall back on the police, the military and
all the other coercive agents of government ... to keep in
check ordinary citizens who had taken to the streets - the
very same people who only a few months ago made up
its loyal, if forgiving, constituency. But if yesterday's
protest were any indication, they are no longer as
forbearing.
There was an attempt to continue the strike into the next day,
however this was a spontaneous decision, not backed up with
sufficient organization, and it fizzled out. Another, better planned,
welga was announced for the following week. The following day
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Manila authorities, apparently with the support of the president's
executive secretary, Joker Arroyo, organized a police raid of the
KMU offices. Over forty people were arrested and detained
overnight; jeepney driver union leader, Merdado Rodawas detained
until the following Monday and charged with fermenting sedition.
This added to the impression that the government was isolated and
was acting in a high-handed and callous manner.
By Thursday evening the pre-existing political situation
seemed to have been greatly transformed. The strike forces,
mainly the National Democratic movement, were being identified
as the popular representatives of the angry citizens, and the
previously popular Aquino government was being depicted as
smug and authoritarian. This did not mean that the forces of
protest had completely stolen Aquino's mantle of leadership but
they had certainly seriously mauled it. What would have emerged
had another protest been launched the following week, would have
been very interesting to see.
Meanwhile, there were other forces who had feared that
Aquino's project of legitimation through the new constitution and
elections would not deliver stability, nor kill the mass movement.
The success of the mass movement's activities, especially the
welgang bayan, confirmed their worst fears. With the mass
movement perhaps regaining the political initiative, and with
Aquino more isolated, these other forces decided to launch a coup
d'etat.
Chapter 4
The Mass Movement and the 28 August Coup d'Etat:
Repolarization
The attempted coup d'etat by Colonel Gregorio ('Gringo')
Honasan marked a watershed in post-Marcos politics. It further
exposed Aquino's vulnerability and thereby helped propel her even
more rapidly in the direction of authoritarian rule. It demonstrated
the reality that Filipino politics is determined by the dynamics of
sharp, severe and serious class conflict, and remains polarized.
The coup attempt and the events surrounding it suggested that it is
impossible to contain that conflict within the boundaries of liberal
democratic, or even conservative, bourgeois democratic rule. It
also had important implications for the mass movement, apart from
sabotaging the momentum that might have emerged from the
welgang bayan.
The coup attempt began at approximately 1.30 am on 28
August 1987 when troops loyal to Colonel Honasan attacked
Malacanang Palace, Channel 4 television station, the main air force
base at Villamor, and AFP headquarters at Camp Aguinaldo. AFP
Chief-of-Staff Ramos set up operational headquarters in Camp
Crame across the road from Aguinaldo and deployed loyal Scout
Rangers outside the Camp. Clashes continued throughout the day,
but it was not until after 3.00 pm in the afternoon that Ramos was
able to launch a serious assault on Camp Aguinaldo. This delay
was symptomatic of a problem which underlay the political
importance of the coup attempt Ramos was apparently unable to
attack because he could not be sure of the loyalty of all the Manila
troops. It was only when the small contingent of Manila-based
marines was able to retake Villamor, and Ramos was able to fly in
loyal troops from Zamboanga, that a full-scale assault on Camp
Aguinaldo could begin.
As the day progressed it was revealed that there was quite
extraordinary support (or at least sympathy) in the AFP for the
coup plotters. Apart from the apparent neutrality of most of the
forces stationed in Manila, at least two thousand soldiers were
actually involved in the attempt. These were reported to include:
...14th Infantry Battalion (Nueva Ecija); 62nd Infantry
Battalion (Nueva Ecija); 3rd, 7th, and 10th Companies of
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the 1st Scout Ranger regiment; PMA [Philippines Military
Academy] Corps of Cadets; PC [Police Constabulary]
Regional Command 7 (Cebu); 3rd Light Armored
Battalion; Philippines Army Special Operations School
(Nueva Ecija); Nueva-Ecija PC-INP [Police
Constabulary-Integrated National Police] Provincial
Command; and DND [Department of National Defense]
military personnel, including the aides of [Defense]
Secretary Rafael Ileto.
In at least six provinces (Cebu, Bohol, Pampanga,
Cagayan, Quirino and Albay) the military overthrew the
civilian authority (Nemenzo 1987:6).
The fact that Ramos had to use 40-year-old Japanese Tora-
tora planes, usually used only for training, suggested that he could
not rely on the combat pilots of the Air Force. With neutral or
unreliable forces on the one hand, and pro-coup forces on the
other, Ramos was left in a weak position. Indeed, the immediate
suppression of the coup was probably made possible only by the
fact that Honasan did not move to seize the telecommunications
system. This fell into Ramos's hands and Honasan was unable to
inform waiting forces in Cebu and Cagayan Valley that it was safe
to fly into Manila with reinforcements.
Within a few hours Camp Aguinaldo had fallen to Ramos.
Honasan and many of his supporters escaped. Other positions
held by Honasan 's troops were, one by one, surrendered. Just
over 1000 of the estimated 2000 troops involved were caught but
many of the rebels surrendered were allowed to go free. With
Honasan and his reserves on the loose, and with the situation
unclear as to how much support within the AFP remained, fears of
another attempt were high for several days.
The attempted coup revealed that a significant section of the
AFP had no interest in the legitimacy that was supposed to flow to
the government as a result of the constitutional plebiscite and
congressional elections. Plebiscites and elections, constitutions
and congresses were obviously irrelevant in the eyes of a large
section of the AFP. The coup also exposed specific criticisms of
the government by the military. Two important statements of
political position were made by the Honasan forces. On the day of
the coup attempt, a group of young officers appeared on
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television. One of their leaders read a statement on the purpose of
the coup. It said that the 'Young Officers Movement' had lost
faith in both the military and political leadership of the country; in
particular, they wished to bring to an end 'the over-indulgence in
politics' which had allowed 'threat groups' to make significant
gains; reference was made specifically to 'developments during the
last few days', obviously the welgang bayan.
A more detailed elaboration of what 'bringing to an end
over-indulgence in politics' might mean was given by Colonel
Honasan in a taped radio interview a few days after the coup. In
it, he made the following criticisms of the government:
Political prisoners of the past regime were released, in
spite of protests from the military, merely in compliance
to a campaign promise.
The Presidential Commission on Human Rights was
established with blanket authority to conduct a witchhunt
within the military.
Experienced and competent military leaders were given
insignificant posts because of their previous relationship
with the deposed dictator.
The pointless ceasefire talks with the CPP-NPA were
pursued.
Insurgency-related statutes were discarded and softer
ones took their place. Rebels were given the right to bail.
Legal fronts of insurgents remain untouched .
Policies and directions on counter-insurgency were
generally vague and were often formulated and adopted in
spite of military advice to the contrary (Philippines
Inquirer, 6 September 1987).
In other words, Honasan was opposed to any purge of the
AFP for human rights abuses or earlier collaboration with Marcos,
was in favour of increased restrictions on legal mass organizations
('legal fronts of insurgents'), and supported the idea of keeping
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political prisoners in gaol. He was opposed to political
reconciliation with the NDF and in favour of an intensified and
coordinated anti-insurgency campaign. These criticisms have to be
seen in the context of the continuing anti-insurgency operations
and military harassment of grassroots organizers from the mass
movement; the fact that most of Marcos's anti-labour and other
repressive laws had not been repealed by Aquino; continuing
arrests of activists in the countryside; the fact that not a single army
officer had been prosecuted as a result of the work of the PCHR
and that the PCHR was given no prosecuting powers; and the
reality that NPA rebels who were caught, such as Rodolfo Salas,
were not being granted bail.
Honasan clearly wanted an even more severe and consistent
application of these policies. From his point of view, successful
actions by the mass movement, such as the welgang bayan, were
sufficient proof that current policies were inadequate to hold back
advances by 'threat groups'. At the same time, the AFP was
making no real progress against the NPA. What Honasan's
demands amounted to was a call for an end to feuding within the
elite and an intensified campaign against both the armed
revolutionary movement and the legal mass movement.
The coup attempt also dramatized Aquino's abandonment of
mobilizational politics. Her demobilizing policies had begun when
she announced the formation of the Constitutional Commission
and campaigned for people to 'wait for Congress'. During 28
August, and even in the few days afterwards, when many of her
sympathizers were urging her to mobilize people in a show of
mass support, she refused. The suppression of Honasan's coup
was left entirely to the military. Only in the wake of the crushing
of the coup did members of Congress appear on television to
discuss what had happened. In her own television and radio
appearances during 28 August, Aquino had made only the usual
rhetorical calls for support, avoiding any call for mobilization and
urging people to stay indoors. Her key political weapon, her
'popularity', was not used and was thereby diminished. Since
then the usually reliable Social Weather station polls have shown a
constant and significant decline in her popularity, from, in
percentage points the high 1970s to the 1950s.
The Mass Movement and the 28 August Coup d'Etat 8 1
Mass movement reactions to the coup attempt
No section of the mass movement was prepared for the August
1987 attempted coup. The National Democratic mainstream was,
at that time, of the view that the Aquino government was
successfully consolidating itself and that the threat of an ultra-
rightist coup had diminished. They considered that Aquino's
adoption of what she called the 'total war' strategy had reduced the
possibility of the ultra-right in the military acting against the
government. Leaders such as Jose Maria Sison did predict a coup
attempt very similar to that which occurred but not for another one
or two years (Sison 1987a: 10-11). The minority section of the
organized movement, represented by groups such as BISIG, gave
greater emphasis to the threat of a coup but did not have the forces
to do anything about it.
The reaction of the various mass movement organizations
during the early part of the coup was to prepare for the worst.
This involved making arrangements for an orderly retreat
underground, as well as preparing for the necessity of a fightback.
From BAYAN leader, Lean Alejandro, came an initiative to unite
the various groups. On 28 August almost all the still-active
components of the mass movement, including some of the
moderate Socdems, met at St Joseph's Church in Manila to
discuss a common position and common strategy. All were united
in their condemnation of the coup, of the killing of civilians that
took place, and of the threat of greater repression that Honasan's
success would have meant. However, different orientations
towards Aquino quickly came to the fore.
For BAYAN, there was no substantial difference in the
political program of the Aquino government and that of the coup
plotters. In an advertisement published in the newspapers on 31
August, BAYAN stated:
It is ironic that the Aquino government has chosen to
adopt a hard-line policy on popular dissent [i.e. arrest of
KMU leaders of welgang bayan] against the backdrop of
its kid-glove treatment of rebellious militarists in the past.
This has encouraged the latter to launch another bid to
seize power. To many minds, last Friday's events can be
construed as simply a conflict of two factions of a
repressive government on the question of who between
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them can be more effective in suppressing the political
rights of the people.
For despite both factions' declarations that they are for
the interests of the people, their practices indicate the
contrary. The Aquino government, prior to the coup,
had shown disregard for its avowed democratic concern
by going on a rampage against oil price hike protesters.
The bloody records of Honasan and company even
during the time of the deposed dictator Marcos are
already known. Today, still unsatisfied with the
repressive measures already employed by the Aquino
government, they are out to accelerate the return to open
terrorist rule.
For the people, therefore, there was no choosing sides.
They did not support the military nor did they rally
behind the President nor respond to her call for people
power in defense of her government. This was unlike
EDSA in February when the people went out in their
numbers to brave the tanks and advance what they then
believed was the alternative to the dictator Marcos. In
last Friday's conflict, there were no alternatives, no
democratic interests at stake. They couldn't care less for
it was nothing but a fight between two sides of the same
coin that spells poverty, oppression and exploitation
(Malaya 31 August 1987, reprinted in Kasarinlan , Vol.
3, No. 1 1987).
The BAYAN statement was not meant to suggest that
members of the National Democratic movement should desist from
intervening should the coup plotters succeed in making a
comeback. BAYAN in fact called on its member organizations to
heighten their vigilance and to prepare to resist any militarist
takeover. But it refused to call on its members and supporters to
defend the Aquino government. This reluctance came from its
analysis of the government as being, like the ultra-right, committed
to the suppression of the mass movement.
Nor was the BAYAN leadership unaware of the implications
of intervening in a conflict between what it saw as two competing
elite factions. Intervention could take the form of either
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mobilization in support of one faction against another, or of action
to provide a rearguard defence of an orderly retreat. In an
interview on 1 September, when another attack by Honasan still
seemed possible, Alejandro made it clear that there were
circumstances under which the National Democratic forces would
ally themselves with Aquino namely, if any new attempt by
Honasan's group seemed likely to succeed, and Aquino should
agree to arm the National Democratic forces (interview with Lean
Alejandro, Manila, 1 September 1987). It is not difficult to
understand the premises and logic underlying Alejandro's
position. The BAYAN leadership considered that any government
takeover by Honasan would involve violent and severe repression;
Honasan had virtually admitted that himself. In Manila at that time
there was considerable talk about the examples of Indonesia in
1965 and Chile after Allende. Such a takeover could not be
effectively resisted in the cities except by force of arms. Without
the arming of the mass movement, it was argued, any non-violent
resistance in the immediate wake of a coup would be crushed. The
alternative to such an armed alliance with the Aquino forces,
explained Alejandro, was an orderly retreat underground. This
would be the only way to save the mass movement forces in the
face of Indonesian-type repression, involving mass arrests and
assassinations.
A further aspect of BAYAN's response was reflected in
Alejandro's public statements that the bankruptcy of the two
opposing elite factions emphasized the need to more energetically
pose the National Democratic movement as a possible alternative
government. There needed, he said, to be another choice for the
people.
In practice, BAYAN's actions in the few days after the coup
were markedly restrained. The welgang bayan proposed for the
following week was postponed, although smaller actions went
ahead in many provincial cities. KMU plans for strikes over wage
rises were also postponed, while a long series of negotiations and
meetings between the LACC and the government began. BAYAN
did, however, organize a series of 'peoples assemblies'
throughout the country, aimed primarily at mobilizing its own
membership to discuss the post-coup situation and to ready them
for any future contingencies. In Manila, the largest of these was
held on the Friday following the coup, amid rumours of possible
military dispersal of the rally and arrests of Alejandro and other
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BAYAN leaders. About 2000 urban poor attended; they were
urged to go back to the workplace and neighbourhood and prepare
for any emergency. The main speakers, Alejandro and Etta
Rosales, curbed their attacks on the Aquino government, although
it was clear that the crowd itself was as and-Aquino as it was anti-
Honasan. At the same time, despite the fact that disagreements
among BAYAN, VPD, BISIG and the Socdems continued to
surface at meetings, contacts were maintained and discussions
continued.
While the National Democratic forces saw no real choice
between the two groups in conflict, BISIG saw a major difference
and immediately took sides:
Despite the current leadership's conservatism and
indecisiveness in instituting basic changes, BISIG
maintains that a bourgeois democratic regime is a hundred
times more preferable than a military dictatorship. BISIG
therefore expresses support for the civilian administration
of President Corazon Aquino in this crisis and declares its
readiness to unite with other democratic forces in a
demonstration of people's power.
We are outraged by [the Aquino government's] recent
policies or lack of policies. Nonetheless we must come
to its defence against the fascist menace. Should the
Aquino administration fall at this particular historical
juncture, the alternative can only be a military
dictatorship. (Gringo's Deadly Adventure, BISIG press
release 30 August 1987, reprinted in Kasarinlan , Vol. 3,
No. 1 1987).
BISIG leaders were fully aware of and concerned about the
harassment that the grassroots mass movement was suffering
under the Aquino government. It felt, however, that a military
dictatorship would bring about even worse repression, and greatly
restrict the room within which the legal mass organizations could
operate. The gains of the February Revolution would be lost. As
in previous disputes with the National Democratic mainstream,
BISIG leaders gave great weight to avoiding the alienation of what
they saw as unorganized mass support for Aquino. A refusal to
defend the government against an ultra-right military takeover
The Mass Movement and the 28 August Coup d'Etat 85
would, they thought, discredit the mass movement in the eyes of
all those who still had hope in the Aquino government. At the
same time, it offered its own criticisms of the government's recent
performance, calling, for example, for the dismissal of all those
government officials involved in the oil price hike.
BISIG's perspective on the tactical requirements of the
situation emphasized the need for a massive show of support for
the government, 'a demonstration of people's power':
We urge President Aquino to call for another massive
display of people's power in order to show the wavering
troops (those who stayed neutral at the critical moment)
as well as Gringo's reserves that if they persist in their
foolishness, they may steal the symbols of authority but
they will not be able to govern. Let us remind these
rascals of the lesson of February: when besieged by an
enraged but disciplined multitude, their soldiers will not
obey orders to open fire (BISIG press release, 30 August
1987).
BISIG's assessment was that wavering sections of the AFP
would refrain from supporting Honasan in any comeback attempt.
BISIG's strategy, however, relied totally on Aquino. It
depended on her calling for a show of mass support. Only Aquino
had, at that time, the ability to mobilize millions (as distinct from
tens of thousands) of people. In the wake of the welgang bayan,
however, there were many observers who wondered whether she
could still muster the numbers. In any case, it had long been clear
that she had rejected mobilizational politics; that rejection was the
essence of her post-February political program.
During the week after the coup, the Coalition for Peace met
regularly. On 6 September it held an emergency conference, to be
followed by a march and rally. It was able to draw in some of the
mainstream BANDBLA and Coryista groups, although not in large
numbers. This broader confederation called itself the Kilusang
para sa Kalayaan at Demokrasya (KKD). The members of KKD
sent messages to Aquino urging her to call for a show of mass
support at the rally. Aquino did not comply and only three
thousand people, mostly pro-Cory elements in the Coalition,
attended the rally (Midweek October 1987 [Melanie Manlogon];
interviews with BISIG and VPD activists, September 1987). The
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uncritical pro-Cory slogans at the rally were too much even for
BISIG and VPD, who did not participate in the march. Aquino
later received a delegation from the Coalition but no move back
towards mobilizational politics was forthcoming.
Both BAYAN's and BISIG's proposed tactical responses to
a successful military takeover revealed their weakness. In both
cases there was a reliance on Aquino; in BAYAN's case for arms,
and in BISIG' s case for a call to mobilize. Neither was probable.
BAYAN was in the stronger position. Because the NDF already
existed as an underground network, it was reasonable for the legal
National Democratic forces to assume that there was somewhere
for them to go if they were declared illegal. The possibility of
preserving a significant section of the National Democratic forces
and continuing the political struggle from underground remained a
realistic option. This was more difficult for BISIG.
In this context, the various mass movement organizations
continued to meet and talk, the more earnestly as Aquino started to
make concessions to the demands of Honasan and other sections
of the military. These concessions further emboldened the ultra-
rightist forces.
Re-polarization
Aquino's initial concession related to the dismissal of her executive
secretary, Joker Arroyo. During the Marcos period Arroyo, a
lawyer, had been associated with the defence of prominent leftists
and had thus come to be labelled by the military as a leftist. He
had been active in MABINI and often had participated in anti-
Marcos mobilizations, though he had never joined any of the major
political groups. There had been a longstanding demand from
within the military for his dismissal. In the aftermath of the coup,
a sustained campaign was launched to force Aquino to dismiss him
(the campaign against Arroyo was front page news in the daily
press between 6 September and 10 September 1987). Eventually,
Aquino asked the whole cabinet to resign and Arroyo was one of
those not reappointed.
Among Aquino's liberal supporters, and even amongst some
hopeful leftists, her cabinet reshuffle was a major disappointment.
These groups had been warning her that if she wished to maintain
popular support in the face of any further coup attempts, she must
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begin seriously to implement the reforms she had promised before
she was elected. They looked upon the resignation of cabinet as
an opportunity to appoint new, reform-oriented ministers. As it
turned out, the new cabinet was essentially a reflection of the old
one, with no new reform-oriented appointees at all. The only new
appointments were retired generals (Philippines Inquirer, Manila
Chronicle, 10 September 1987).
More importantly, Aquino's spokespersons began to repeat
frequently that the AFP had always had a 'free hand' in its
offensives against the NPA. In the context of the coup, public
reiteration of this 'free hand' policy could only be interpreted as a
signal of support by Aquino for increased anti-insurgency activity
and, therefore, increased military intervention against the mass
movement in the countryside and in the slum areas of Manila
where the NPA's armed urban units were based.
At a meeting with members of Congress and
businesspeople, Aquino also made clear her commitment to use the
police to bring an end to so-called 'illegal' strikes. This policy
was reaffirmed more strongly in a speech on 20 October
(Philippines Inquirer, 21 October 1987). Following that speech,
the police moved in and violently dispersed over twenty pickets
throughout Manila, even though the pickets had not been declared
illegal by the appropriate authorities. The KMU re-established its
pickets, which were again broken up by the police. At a meeting
in November with LACC leaders, including Crispin Beltran from
the KMU, Aquino refused to give a commitment to bring an end to
the police actions. Even though most of the strikes had not been
declared illegal, Aquino publicly praised the efforts of the police.
The raid on the KMU office and the overnight detention of KMU
leaders and employees the day before the coup had angered all the
active mass movement groups.
Aquino's turn rightwards also emboldened those still further
to her right. Vice-President Laurel embarked on an extraordinary
tour of military camps, addressing meetings of officers and men
and asking them rhetorically such questions as: 'Do you want
Colonel Honasan pardoned?' 'Do you want the Leftists [sic] in the
cabinet removed?' (Philippines Inquirer, Manila Chronicle, The
Star, Malaya, 9 September 1987; television reports, Manila,
September 1987.) Laurel later refused to resume his post as
foreign affairs minister saying that he did not agree with the
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government's 'kid gloves' approach in its fight against the
communists.
Honasan himself was able to maintain a high profile in the
media, giving secret interviews to the press and television even
while the AFP were supposed to be hunting him down. Former
Defense Minister Enrile, and his supporters in the Congress, also
went on the propaganda offensive arguing that Honasan and his
supporters would not have rebelled without good cause. See
especially a seven page interview with Honasan published in The
Independent, 14 September 1987.
The most ominous development, however, was the
assassination of the young BAYAN secretary-general, Lean
Alejandro. Returning from a press conference to BAYAN
headquarters in Quezon City, his car was attacked by gunmen in
what was obviously a well-planned operation. Alejandro was shot
in the head and died immediately. Two of his three companions
also were seriously wounded (Midweek, 7 October 1987). The
considerable strength of the National Democratic forces was
exhibited when at least 150,000 supporters, mostly workers,
peasants and students, attended a 40 kilometre funeral march for
Alejandro on 30 September.
The mass movement and the underground responded with a
number of new political initiatives. Most important among these
was an attempt to re-form a united front of legal forces opposed to
the swing back towards authoritarianism. A sign of possible
future trends was the formation of the National Movement for
Civil Liberties (NMCL), an alliance which grew out of the
discussions that began at St Joseph's Church on 28 August 1987.
The first congress of the NMCL took place in February 1988. The
breadth of support it attracted indicates the extent of concern over
the post-coup shift to the right within the mass movement. Present
were leaders of the National Democratic organizations such as
BAYAN, KMU and KMP; leaders of BISIG, VPD and Pandayan;
members of Congress such as Abad, Coseteng and Gillego; key
Libdems such as former Labor Minister Sanche; figures from
MABINI and FLAG; several outspoken church leaders and well-
known journalists and intellectuals such as Professor Renato
Constantino and Petronilo Danoy. Figures associated with the old
Communist Party, the PKP, joined later. However, the
mainstream Socdem and other more conservative forces were not
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represented; they remained organized through the Coalition for
Peace, which did not include the Natdems.
The NMCL's first manifesto, Solidarity in Defence of Civil
Liberties, clearly recognized the convergence taking place
amongst the various factions of those in power and those on the
political right:
...the Honasan putschists and the so-called
constitutionalists [i.e. Ramos] have used the alleged
neglect of the military establishment as an excuse in their
differing thrusts for power. Also common to both as a
justification for their claims to power is the demand for a
military solution to the insurgency without recognizing its
social and economic roots. Laurel and his ilk have
similarly thrown their hats into the ring with their
communist witchhunting.
The tragedy is that the civilian authority has acceded to
the demands of the militarists and has increasingly
adopted repressive measures against the masses who are
working for basic social change.
The government must stand firmly on the principle of
civilian supremacy, and purge the AFP of its anti-people
and corrupt elements and thoroughly reorient its
personnel along nationalist and democratic lines.
Moreover, the government must undertake genuine
reforms to propel socio-economic development based on
social justice.
Four factions were attacked: the two main wings of the
military - Honasan and Ramos - and the two main wings of the
civilian establishment - Laurel (and Enrile) and Aquino (who
represented 'civilian authority'). The manifesto continued with a
call to mobilizational politics:
In these uncertain and critical times, with the military's
increasing domination over civilian authority and the
widespread use of fascistic practices, it devolves upon
the people to organize and mobilize themselves towards
the defence of democracy, the quest for justice of victims
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of human rights violations and the unremitting straggle
for civil liberties and people's welfare.
The NMCL also issued a strongly-worded statement, as a
full-page paid advertisement, attacking Aquino's public support
for the armed rightist vigilantes operating in Davao City. Aquino
visited Davao and appeared publicly with the leadership of the Alsa
Masa group, which had been responsible for a number of killings.
The advertisement featured a well-publicized photograph of Alsa
Masa vigilantes holding up the severed head of one of their
victims.
It is too early to predict how rapidly the attempts to forge
new 'parliament-of-the-streets' alliances will develop. The
launching of the NMCL, collaboration among a broad range of
groups in organizing the funeral arrangements for Lean Alejandro,
the longstanding success of LACC, and the ongoing activities of
the CPAR do, however, indicate that there is a strong awareness
of the need for unity.
Past conflicts and continuing disagreements still bear down
on the movement, as is shown by the existence in the movement of
the separate BAYAN and Coalition for Peace groups. The major
dispute between these two groups, however, has always revolved
around the question of how to orient towards the Aquino
government and its popular support. Aquino's own sharp turn to
the right has become an important factor in forcing new
developments on this issue. The organizations within the
Coalition for Peace are rethinking their support, whether critical or
unequivocal, for Aquino.
This new polarization, or re-polarization, is reflected in the
call made by BISIG following police raids on the Philippines
Polytechnic University (PUP), where refugees from right-wing
vigilantes in Leyte had been housed. Scores were arrested,
without warrants. They were later released but many were then re
arrested, again without warrants, and accused of being members
of the NPA. The police did not at the time produce any evidence.
Aquino supported the raids. Subsequently there was an
assassination attempt on the president of the university, Dr
Nemesio Pradente, a leading member of the Coalition for Peace.
A PUP lawyer who was travelling with Pradente was killed. A
right-wing death squad,wa/mg-waling, later claimed responsibility
for the assassination attempt. The BISIG statement said:
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Earlier, BISIG had warned of an emergent neo-fascism
which found its most brutal representatives in the likes of
Gringo Honasan. We fear that this neo-fascism has
extended its reach and has even started to engulf the very
government that Honasan and his cabal wanted to
overthrow.
A new situation has unfolded. New strategies and tactics
must be conceived and old ones modified.... Unity has
never been a more urgent task ('The PUP raids and the
broadening of neo-Fascism' , BISIG statement, 6
November 1987).
The Coalition for Peace also increased its criticism of the
government in a manner which indicated it was moving away from
a 'critical support' position. In a statement condemning the police
raids, it said:
Finally, we are deeply concerned about the trend towards
political repression which this incident highlights. The
PUP raid is only one among a series of disturbing events
which puts into question the government's commitment to
democracy: the regular raids on urban poor areas; the
assumption of police forces of the right to determine the
legality of the strikes and pickets; the continuing
harassment of leaders of peoples organizations working
for social reform; and the endorsement by government of
vigilante groups without the mechanisms for controlling
their potential for abuse ('Statement on the PUP raid',
issued by coalition for Peace 2 November 1987). l
At the time of this statement the organizations affiliated with the
Coalition for Peace included: Alliance of Concerned Teachers, BANDILA,
BISIG, Filipino Social Democratic Movement (FDSM), KAAKBAY,
KASAPI, Lakas Manggagawa Labour Centre, Pandayan, Philippines
Democratic Socialist Party (PDSP), and volunteers for Popular
Democracy. What the support of this statement by mainstream Socdem
organizations (BANDILA, FSDM, PDSP and KASAPI) implies for the
position of pro-government figures, such as Butz Aquino and Teofista
Guingona, is not clear.
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This re-orientation has been characterized by Alex Magno in
a recent essay in Kasarinlan, entitled 'The New Polarization':
The [February 86] Uprising might have, in fact, arrived at
a merely transitional arrangement, a disposable regime
doomed to unravel by its intrinsic limitations. Its mode of
accession was superficial, its historical vision myopic, its
basis of support probably volatile.
This possibility is a spectre haunting the minds of those
who prefer to believe that the Aquino government
represents a definite historical phase, an irreversible and
desirable transition from the dark age of the dictatorship.
It taxes the hopefulness of those social sectors the Aquino
government counts on most for support.
The liberal democratic arrangement as the crucial outer
perimeter of a political condition favorable to the
consolidation of popular democracy and conducive to
popular empowerment. They have, in the past, thrown
their support behind the Aquino government and vowed
to defend it against attacks from the ultra-right.
Now they are desperately searching for evidence to show
that this political arrangement is worth defending - or
even that this political arrangement indeed exists.
{Kasarinlan , Vol. 3, No. 1 1987).
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